Short answer. Ohio lets lawyers in different firms divide fees only if all of these apply: the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client; the client has given written consent after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and whether the division will be in proportion to services or rest on each lawyer’s joint responsibility; except where court approval of the fee division is obtained, the written closing statement in a case involving a contingent fee is signed by the client and each lawyer and complies with division (c)(2) of the rule; and the total fee is reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)). The rule states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share.
Sources read October 8, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 27, 2026. Rules text is as printed in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s PDF of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, fetched October 8, 2026; Ohio Revised Code sections are from codes.ohio.gov, fetched October 8, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.
Ohio’s referral fee rules at a glance
| Question | Ohio’s answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Governing rule | Rule 1.5(e), Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct (Prof.Cond.R.) | Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e), Supreme Court of Ohio PDF |
| Written client consent | Required in every division: the client gives written consent after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and the basis of the division | Rule 1.5(e)(2) |
| Notice to the client | Full disclosure before consent; in a contingent-fee case, unless a court approves the division, a written closing statement signed by the client and each lawyer | Rule 1.5(e)(2)–(3) |
| Proportion to services or joint responsibility | Required: in proportion to services, or joint responsibility with each lawyer available for consultation with the client | Rule 1.5(e)(1) |
| Reasonable total fee | Required | Rule 1.5(e)(4) |
| Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share | None stated in Rule 1.5(e) | Rule 1.5(e) |
| Statutes | In tort contingent-fee matters, a written fee agreement signed by attorney and client, and a signed closing statement specifying any proposed division with referring or associated counsel; consumer legal funding companies may not pay or take referral fees from attorneys | R.C. 4705.15(B)–(C); R.C. 1357.04(A), (B), (D) |
What Rule 1.5(e) says
Rule 1.5(e) of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct governs the division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Its words, as printed in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s PDF fetched October 8, 2026 (Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e)):
(e) Lawyers who are not in the same firm may divide fees only if all of the following apply:
(1) the division of fees is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation and agrees to be available for consultation with the client;
(2) the client has given written consent after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and that the division of fees will be in proportion to the services to be performed by each lawyer or that each lawyer will assume joint responsibility for the representation;
(3) except where court approval of the fee division is obtained, the written closing statement in a case involving a contingent fee shall be signed by the client and each lawyer and shall comply with the terms of division (c)(2) of this rule;
(4) the total fee is reasonable.
The date these words took effect is not established in our sources, and this page gives none. They are stated here as printed when fetched in October 2026.
What the client must agree to in writing
Every division between lawyers not in the same firm needs the client’s written consent, given after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and whether the division will be in proportion to the services each lawyer will perform or rest on each lawyer’s joint responsibility for the representation (Rule 1.5(e)(2)). ABA Model Rule 1.5(e)(2) asks that the client agree to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and that the agreement be confirmed in writing; Ohio’s rule asks for the client’s written consent and does not name each lawyer’s share.
The Board of Professional Conduct has advised that lawyers dividing a contingent fee also need a written contingent fee agreement signed by the lawyers and the client under Rule 1.5(c)(1) (Opinion 2016-11). By statute, a contingent-fee agreement for legal services on a claim that is or may become the basis of a tort action must be in writing and signed by the attorney and the client, and the attorney must give the client a copy of the signed writing (R.C. 4705.15(B)).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has applied Rule 1.5(e)’s written-consent requirement in these decisions:
- In Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexander (2012), a lawyer who shared $200 of a $500 fee with a lawyer who had never practiced in his firm, under an oral agreement between them and without the client’s written consent, violated Rule 1.5(e)(2), although he testified the client knew he was taking over the case from the other lawyer.
- In Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire (2011), the Court held that the client family’s general awareness of the other lawyers’ involvement and fee arrangements had no bearing on compliance with Rule 1.5(e), where the lawyer acknowledged there was no written agreement to divide the fees. It dismissed the 1.5(e) charge because no fee was collected or split.
- In Columbus Bar Association v. Chodosh (2019), a lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e) in two matters where his fee agreements named a referring firm as co-counsel to receive one-third of any fees, but did not tell the client in writing that each lawyer was assuming joint responsibility or that the division would be in proportion to the services each performed.
What must be disclosed to the client
Before consenting, the client must be told the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and whether the division is in proportion to the services each lawyer will perform or rests on each lawyer’s joint responsibility (Rule 1.5(e)(2)).
In a case involving a contingent fee, except where court approval of the fee division is obtained, the written closing statement must be signed by the client and each lawyer and comply with division (c)(2) of Rule 1.5 (Rule 1.5(e)(3)). ABA Model Rule 1.5(e) has no closing-statement requirement.
By statute, where an attorney represents a client on a claim that is or may become the basis of a tort action under a contract that includes a contingent fee agreement, and the attorney becomes entitled to compensation under that agreement, the attorney must prepare a signed closing statement and give it to the client at the time of or prior to the receipt of compensation. The statement must specify the manner in which the attorney’s compensation was determined, any costs and expenses deducted from the judgment or settlement, any proposed division of the attorney’s fees, costs and expenses with referring or associated counsel, and any other information the attorney considers appropriate (R.C. 4705.15(C)).
Proportionality or joint responsibility
One of the two is required. The division must be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or each lawyer must assume joint responsibility for the representation and agree to be available for consultation with the client (Rule 1.5(e)(1)). The consultation clause is not in ABA Model Rule 1.5(e)(1). The total fee must be reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)(4)).
In Adams v. Morningstar (2022), the Ohio Court of Appeals, Fourth District, affirming frivolous-conduct sanctions, held that a lawyer’s promise to divide fees with another lawyer to compensate him for recommending the lawyer’s services conflicted with Rule 1.5(e), because the other lawyer was not in the same firm, performed no services on the case and did not assume joint responsibility.
Who is in the same firm. The Board treats a lawyer properly designated “of counsel” as in the same firm, so the restrictions of Rule 1.5(e) do not apply to that lawyer (Opinion 2008-1; Opinion 2014-4). Lawyers who practice in association but not in a partnership, of-counsel or other legal relationship are not in the “same firm” and must fully comply with Rule 1.5(e) (Opinion 2016-11), and lawyers sharing office space are not in the same firm (Opinion 2022-11).
Referring a case out of Ohio, or into it
Ohio’s choice-of-law rule, Rule 8.5(b), follows ABA Model Rule 8.5(b)(1) and (2), including the safe harbor. It says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Ohio exercises its disciplinary authority (Prof.Cond.R. 8.5(b)):
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of Ohio, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise;
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.
The date these words took effect is not established in our sources, and this page gives none.
From another state. State Bar of Michigan ethics opinion RI-382 (2021) advises Michigan lawyers that a fee division with an out-of-state lawyer must comply with the rules of both jurisdictions, and in a note describes Ohio Rule 1.5(e) as imposing four requirements. It is Michigan advice, not an Ohio ruling.
No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral. Our research found no Ohio decision, Board opinion or statute applying Rule 8.5(b), but its case-law search ran no query naming Rule 8.5 and no full-text search of the Ohio Revised Code was run, so this page does not say none exists.
Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers
- Payment for referrals. “A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services,” except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by Rule 7.2; the usual charges of a legal service plan; the usual charges for a nonprofit or lawyer referral service that complies with Rule XVI of the Supreme Court Rules for the Government of the Bar of Ohio; and for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17 (Rule 7.2(b)(1)–(4)). The Board has advised that a lawyer may pay for advertising but may not pay another person or a for-profit entity to channel professional work to the lawyer (Opinion 2016-3). This page does not state what compliance with Gov.Bar R. XVI requires.
- Nonlawyers. A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except as Rule 5.4(a)(1)–(5) allows: payment over a reasonable period of time after a lawyer’s death to the lawyer’s estate or one or more specified persons, under an agreement with the lawyer’s firm, partner or associate; the agreed-upon purchase price of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer’s practice, paid under Rule 1.17 to the estate or other representative of that lawyer; including nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even one based in whole or in part on profit-sharing; sharing court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed or retained the lawyer in the matter; and sharing legal fees with a nonprofit organization that recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter, if the organization complies with Gov.Bar R. XVI (Rule 5.4(a)). In Cincinnati Bar Association v. Hoskins (2016), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a lawyer who paid a referral company half of his 25 percent contingent fee in the Social Security disability cases it referred to him violated Rules 5.4(a) and 7.2(b)(3); the company was not a lawyer referral service under Gov.Bar R. XVI.
- Solicitation. Rule 7.3 (solicitation) is not covered by our research for this page, and this page does not state Ohio’s solicitation rule.
- Statutes. By statute, a consumer legal funding company may not pay or offer to pay a commission, referral fee or other form of consideration to any attorney or law firm, or any employee or agent of either, for referring a consumer to the company; may not accept any commission, referral fee, rebate or other form of consideration from them; and may not refer a consumer or potential consumer to a specific attorney or law firm, except that, if a consumer does not have legal representation, the company may refer the consumer to a state or local lawyer referral service operated by a bar association or nonprofit organization, or a legal aid society, as defined in R.C. 120.51 (R.C. 1357.04(A), (B), (D)). This page does not say whether any other Ohio statute addresses fee sharing with nonlawyers, runners or referral services.
Ohio cases
We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law. McCord (2009), Schiff (2014) and Bauer (2015) applied former DR 2-107(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility to conduct before February 1, 2007, alongside Rule 1.5(e), and Linnen (2013) relied on a decision on former DR 2-107(B); their holdings are stated as their own.
| Case | Citation | Year | What it held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disciplinary Counsel v. McCord | 121 Ohio St.3d 497; 2009-Ohio-1517 | 2009 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted findings that a lawyer improperly shared workers’ compensation fees with a lawyer who was not his associate or employee, with no fee-sharing agreement for those matters. The conduct ran from 2005 to 2007, so the Court applied former DR 2-107(A), the earlier fee-division rule, together with Rule 1.5(e). |
| Disciplinary Counsel v. Mason | 2010 Ohio 1467; 125 Ohio St. 3d 29; 925 N.E.2d 963 | 2010 | Supreme Court of Ohio, on a consent-to-discipline agreement: a lawyer violated Rule 7.2(b) where a consulting company he owned, an ancillary business to his law firm, paid a nonlawyer employee referral fees for eight clients the employee referred to the firm in 2007. Public reprimand. |
| Hackett v. Moore | 160 Ohio Misc. 2d 107; 2010 Ohio 6298 | 2010 | Ohio trial court, on a motion to dismiss: an employment-agreement term requiring a departing associate to pay his former employer 95 percent of the fee from a client who chose to follow him would seem to violate Rule 1.5, because the division did not appear to be in proportion to the services performed and there was no indication the client gave written consent. The court held the agreement unenforceable as against Ohio’s public policy of allowing a client counsel of his choice. |
| Kelley v. Ferraro | 188 Ohio App. 3d 734; 2010 WL 2432851 | 2010 | Ohio Court of Appeals rejected a law firm’s argument that paying contingency fees to a deceased partner’s estate under the partnership agreement would violate Rules 5.4(a)(1) and 5.4(d)(1). The court said those rules indicate that a law firm may properly share fees with a deceased lawyer’s estate, and held the agreement enforceable. |
| Disciplinary Counsel v. Folwell | 2011 Ohio 3181; 129 Ohio St. 3d 297 | 2011 | Supreme Court of Ohio, on stipulated facts and misconduct adopted by the board: a lawyer who agreed to pay his nonlawyer secretary ten percent of a contingent fee, and paid her $200 of it, violated Rule 5.4(a). |
| Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire | 2011 Ohio 5578; 130 Ohio St. 3d 368 | 2011 | Supreme Court of Ohio held that the client family’s general awareness of the other lawyers’ involvement and fee arrangements had no bearing on compliance with Rule 1.5(e), where the lawyer acknowledged there was no written agreement to divide the fees. It dismissed the 1.5(e) charge because no fee was collected or split. |
| Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexander | 133 Ohio St.3d 232; 2012-Ohio-4575 | 2012 | Supreme Court of Ohio: a lawyer who shared $200 of a $500 fee with a lawyer who had never practiced in his firm, under an oral agreement between them and without the client’s written consent, violated Rule 1.5(e)(2), although he testified the client knew he was taking over the case from the other lawyer. |
| Linnen Co., L.P.A. v. Roubic | 2013-Ohio-1022 | 2013 | Ohio Court of Appeals, Ninth District: a fee dispute between lawyers of different firms was subject to bar-association arbitration under Rule 1.5(f) even if their division of fees did not comply with 1.5(e); failure to comply with 1.5(e) “may have additional consequences” but does not negate the existence of a fee dispute. The court relied on Shimko v. Lobe (2004), which construed former DR 2-107(B), the earlier wording now in 1.5(f). |
| Geauga County Bar Association v. Snyder | 2013 Ohio 3688; 136 Ohio St. 3d 320; 995 N.E.2d 222 | 2013 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the board’s finding that a lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e) where, from each out-of-state client’s flat fee, $200 to $500 was sent to the out-of-state lawyer his firm listed as “of counsel” for that state. Public reprimand. |
| Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Schiff | 2014 Ohio 2573; 139 Ohio St. 3d 456; 12 N.E.3d 1207 | 2014 | Supreme Court of Ohio: a lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e) where his 2008 contingent-fee contract named a second lawyer outside his firm but did not disclose that the fees would be divided or how, so the client was not afforded an opportunity to give written consent to the division. For the same kind of contracts in 2005 and 2006 the Court applied former DR 2-107(A), the earlier wording. |
| Gullotta v. McKinzie | 2014-Ohio-5729 | 2014 | Ohio Court of Appeals, Fifth District, on a client’s claim that a contingent-fee agreement was illegal under Rule 1.5(c)(2) and (e): the trial court correctly found the rule inapplicable to the facts, and, assuming a violation, a violation of Rule 1.5 does not necessarily render the fee agreement unenforceable (relying on the Preamble). |
| Mahoning County Bar Association v. Bauer | 143 Ohio St.3d 519; 2015-Ohio-3653 | 2015 | Supreme Court of Ohio: a lawyer who recommended another lawyer to clients in 2000, had no written fee agreement with them, and later sued the handling lawyer for a share of the fee violated Rules 1.5(e) and 1.5(f), and former DR 2-107(A)(2), the earlier wording. Public reprimand. |
| Mahoning County Bar Association v. Marrelli | 2015 Ohio 4614; 144 Ohio St. 3d 253; 41 N.E.3d 1242 | 2015 | Supreme Court of Ohio: a lawyer was deemed, by her default, to have committed the charged violations, including Rule 1.5(e)(2), in a 2010 matter in which another law firm served as her co-counsel. Indefinite suspension; the opinion gives no analysis of the rule. |
| Disciplinary Counsel v. Corner | 145 Ohio St.3d 192; 2016-Ohio-359 | 2016 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted stipulations that a lawyer who failed to obtain a client’s written consent to share her legal fees with another attorney violated Rule 1.5(e). |
| Cincinnati Bar Association v. Hoskins | 149 Ohio St.3d 645; 2016-Ohio-4576 | 2016 | Supreme Court of Ohio: a lawyer who paid a referral company half of his 25 percent contingent fee in the Social Security disability cases it referred to him violated Rules 5.4(a) and 7.2(b)(3). The company was not a lawyer referral service under Gov.Bar R. XVI, and the payments fell within no exception to 5.4(a) or 7.2(b)(3); 5.4(a)(5) lets a lawyer share fees with a nonprofit organization that recommended the lawyer only if it complies with Gov.Bar R. XVI. |
| Lorain County Bar Association v. Johnson | 2017 Ohio 6869 | 2017 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the board’s finding that a lawyer who served as co-counsel with a lawyer from another firm violated Rule 1.5(e) where they never obtained the client’s written consent to his involvement or to their fee-sharing arrangement. |
| Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Horton | 2018 Ohio 2390; 106 N.E.3d 36; 153 Ohio St. 3d 327 | 2018 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted findings that a lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e)(2) where she told the client orally that she intended to engage another attorney as co-counsel, but the terms were never reduced to a writing signed by the client and the other attorney. |
| Columbus Bar Association v. Chodosh | 156 Ohio St.3d 288; 2019-Ohio-765 | 2019 | Supreme Court of Ohio: a lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e) in two matters where his fee agreements named a referring firm as co-counsel to receive one-third of any fees, but did not tell the client in writing that each lawyer was assuming joint responsibility or that the division would be in proportion to the services each performed. In one, the referring firm was paid with no evidence that any of its lawyers had worked on the case. |
| Cincinnati Bar Association v. Begovic | 2019 Ohio 4531 | 2019 | Supreme Court of Ohio upheld a finding that a lawyer violated Rule 5.4(a) where he was paid a set salary by a lawyer under suspension and the record raised the inference that the salary came from fees the suspended lawyer collected from clients for his work; he stipulated to the violation. |
| Adams v. Morningstar | 2022-Ohio-918 | 2022 | Ohio Court of Appeals, Fourth District, affirming frivolous-conduct sanctions: a lawyer’s promise to divide fees with another lawyer to compensate him for recommending the lawyer’s services conflicted with Rule 1.5(e), because the other lawyer was not in the same firm, performed no services on the case and did not assume joint responsibility. In a footnote the court noted the promise also conflicted with 7.2(b), though no evidence on that rule was offered below. |
| Disciplinary Counsel v. Shaaban | 173 Ohio St. 3d 146; 227 N.E.3d 1226; 2023 Ohio 3671 | 2023 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the board’s finding that a lawyer violated Rule 5.4(a) where the nonlawyer owner of a foreclosure-services company referred clients to him, collected their fees, and paid him “however much he saw fit.” |
| Columbus Bar Association v. Cable | 181 Ohio St.3d 352; 2026-Ohio-89 | 2026 | Supreme Court of Ohio adopted findings that a lawyer violated Rule 7.2(b) by paying two marketing companies a fee for each client they referred to him, and 7.3(a) through their live telephone solicitation of accident victims. One-year suspension, fully stayed on conditions. |
Ohio advisory opinions
These opinions are advisory. Opinions 2008-1 and 2014-4 were issued by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline; the others by the Board of Professional Conduct. As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched.
| Opinion | Year | What it said |
|---|---|---|
| Opinion 2008-1 | 2008 | An “of counsel” lawyer is considered a lawyer in the same firm for purposes of division of fees, so the restrictions in Rule 1.5(e) on division of fees with lawyers not in the same firm do not apply to a lawyer properly designated “of counsel.” |
| Opinion 2014-4, “Law Firm In ‘Of Counsel’ Relationship With Another Law Firm” | 2014 | A law firm may enter an “of counsel” relationship with another law firm; in Ohio “of counsel” lawyers are considered to be in the same firm for division of fees, so the restrictions of Rule 1.5(e) do not apply. |
| Opinion 2016-3, “Lawyer Participation in Referral Services” | 2016 | A lawyer’s participation in an online, nonlawyer-owned referral service that requires a “marketing fee” for each completed client matter is unethical; it implicates the ban on fee-splitting with nonlawyers (5.4(a)), and a fee tied to individual client matters or to a percentage of the fee is not permissible unless the lawyer referral service is registered with the Supreme Court of Ohio (7.2(b)(3), Gov.Bar R. XVI). A lawyer may pay for advertising but may not pay another person or a for-profit entity to channel professional work to the lawyer (7.2(b)). |
| Opinion 2016-11, “Division of Fees By Lawyers Not in the Same Firm” | 2016 | Lawyers who practice in association but not in a partnership, of-counsel or other legal relationship are not in the “same firm” and must fully comply with Rule 1.5(e). When they agree to divide a fee, a written contingent fee agreement signed by the lawyers and the client (1.5(c)(1)) and the client’s written consent to the division under 1.5(e)(2) are required. |
| Opinion 2021-02, “Loan from Financial Institution to Advance Costs and Expenses of Litigation” | 2021 | When a law firm borrows to advance litigation costs and repayment is not tied to a percentage of the legal fee and the loan is not secured by the client’s settlement or judgment, there is no sharing of legal fees with a nonlawyer under Rule 5.4(a). |
| Opinion 2021-7, “Employment Agreements Regarding Division of Fees Earned Post-Separation” | 2021 | A law firm may not require an associate to agree to pay the firm, after leaving, a percentage of fees from clients who choose to stay with the associate. Under Rule 1.5(e), enforcing such an agreement would impose a division of the client’s fees without the client’s consent and without the firm’s joint responsibility for the matter. |
| Opinion 2022-11, “Lawyers Sharing Office Space, Nonlawyer Staff, and Dividing Fees” | 2022 | Lawyers sharing office space are not in the same firm and may divide fees only under Rule 1.5(e): in proportion to services or with each lawyer assuming joint responsibility and agreeing to be available for consultation, with the client’s written consent, a written closing statement signed by the client and each lawyer, and a reasonable total fee. |
| Opinion 2023-11, “Nonlawyer Employee Bonus Plan” | 2023 | A lawyer may not pay nonlawyer staff a bonus based solely on a positive online review; while 5.4(a)(3) allows nonlawyer employees in compensation plans based on profit-sharing, such a bonus impermissibly ties it to a particular client or matter. A strict reading of 7.2(b) may not find that the lawyer gave something of value for a recommendation, but the Board advises against the structure. |
| Opinion 2024-04, “Fee Mediation or Arbitration Between Departed Lawyer and Former Law Firm” | 2024 | Rule 1.5(f)’s mandatory fee mediation or arbitration applies only to disputes between lawyers who were not in the same firm at the outset and agreed to divide fees under 1.5(e). It does not apply to a departed lawyer and the former firm unless the firm, the departed lawyer and the client enter a new fee agreement governed by 1.5(e). |
What our research did not find
- R.C. 4705.15(B) and (C) and R.C. 1357.04(A), (B) and (D) are read from codes.ohio.gov with no effective date stored. The other divisions of R.C. 4705.15, and R.C. 1357.04(C), are not held. R.C. 4123.96 and 4123.06 are held in our research under Rule 7.3, which this page does not cover, and this page does not describe them.
- No Ohio statute on fee sharing with nonlawyers, on runners outside workers’ compensation, or regulating lawyer referral services was found by site and web searches of codes.ohio.gov on October 8, 2026. No full-text search of the Ohio Revised Code was run, so this page does not say Ohio has no such statute.
- Rule 7.3 (solicitation) is not covered here. Cable (2026) and Snyder (2013) also found Rule 7.3 violations; the words of Rule 7.3 before 2015 are not held, and a later amendment of 7.3 has not been found. This page does not state Ohio’s solicitation rule. Rule 1.5(f), named by Linnen, Bauer and Opinion 2024-04, is not covered either, and this page does not state its terms.
- The date each Ohio rule part quoted here took effect is not established. The Rules took effect February 1, 2007, but the 2007 adoption order and the 2011 Rule 8.5 amendment are held only as files that were not read; the 2015 amendments made no change to the black-letter of Rules 7.2 or 8.5; and the words of Rule 8.5(b) before 2011 are not held. This page gives no effective date for any rule part.
- McCord (2009), Schiff (2014) and Bauer (2015) applied former DR 2-107(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility to conduct before February 1, 2007, alongside Rule 1.5(e), and Linnen (2013) relied on Shimko v. Lobe (2004) on former DR 2-107(B); their holdings are stated as their own. Authorities applying only the former Code (Board opinions before 2007, and decisions such as Jackson (2010)) are not cited here.
- Gov.Bar R. XVI, with which Rules 7.2(b)(3) and 5.4(a)(5) require a referral service or nonprofit organization to comply, was not read for this page, including its Section 2 (the terms every referral service must include). This page does not state what compliance with Rule XVI requires.
- Only Board advisory opinions are held; Ohio State Bar Association opinions were not reached. The Board’s index was read through April 30, 2025, and Opinions 25-03 and 26-01 to 26-03 by title only. Seven decisions and 17 Board opinion candidates found in our research were not collected, and Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Hackett (2011), cited by Opinion 2021-7, is not held.
- No Ohio decision, Board opinion or statute applying Rule 8.5(b) was found (searched October 8, 2026), but the case-law search ran no query naming Rule 8.5 and no full-text search of the Revised Code was run. This page does not say no Ohio court has applied Rule 8.5(b).
- Snyder (2013) found a Rule 1.5(e) violation in fees sent to out-of-state lawyers the firm listed as “of counsel”, without saying why that designation did not place them in the same firm; Opinions 2008-1 and 2014-4 say a properly designated “of counsel” lawyer is in the same firm. Gullotta (2014) holds Rule 1.5(e) inapplicable to its facts without saying why, and Marrelli (2015) is a default with no analysis. This page rests no general statement on any of these three.
- Later treatment of every Ohio authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held, not that it remains good law.
Frequently asked questions
Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Ohio?
Yes, under Rule 1.5(e) of the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, if all of its conditions apply. The division must be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or each lawyer must assume joint responsibility for the representation and agree to be available for consultation with the client; the client must give written consent after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and whether the division will be in proportion to services or rest on each lawyer’s joint responsibility; except where court approval of the fee division is obtained, the written closing statement in a case involving a contingent fee must be signed by the client and each lawyer and comply with division (c)(2) of the rule; and the total fee must be reasonable. In Adams v. Morningstar (2022), an Ohio Court of Appeals held that a promise to divide fees with a lawyer who was not in the same firm, performed no services on the case and did not assume joint responsibility conflicted with Rule 1.5(e).
Is there a cap on referral fees in Ohio?
Rule 1.5(e) states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. It requires that the total fee be reasonable, and that the division be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility for the representation and agree to be available for consultation with the client.
Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Ohio?
Yes. Every division between lawyers not in the same firm needs the client’s written consent, given after full disclosure of the identity of each lawyer, that the fees will be divided, and whether the division will be in proportion to services or rest on each lawyer’s joint responsibility (Rule 1.5(e)(2)). Unlike ABA Model Rule 1.5(e)(2), Ohio’s rule does not name each lawyer’s share among the things disclosed. The Board of Professional Conduct has advised that lawyers dividing a contingent fee also need a written contingent fee agreement signed by the lawyers and the client (Opinion 2016-11).
Can an Ohio lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?
Rule 1.5(e) sets the conditions for any division between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Ohio’s choice-of-law rule, Rule 8.5(b), applies in Ohio discipline, for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction where the tribunal sits, unless the tribunal’s rules provide otherwise; and for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred or, if its predominant effect is in a different jurisdiction, that jurisdiction’s rules. A lawyer is not subject to discipline if the conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction where the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect will occur. A Michigan ethics opinion, RI-382 (2021), advises Michigan lawyers that a division with an out-of-state lawyer must comply with the rules of both jurisdictions; it is Michigan advice, not an Ohio ruling. No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral.
Sources
- Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules 1.5, 5.4, 7.2, 8.5), Supreme Court of Ohio PDF, fetched October 8, 2026: supremecourt.ohio.gov
- Ohio Revised Code § 4705.15, fetched October 8, 2026: codes.ohio.gov
- Ohio Revised Code § 1357.04, fetched October 8, 2026: codes.ohio.gov
- State Bar of Michigan ethics opinion RI-382 (2021): michbar.org
- Cases and advisory opinions: linked in the tables above.
More states: Referral fee rules by state.
Disclaimer
This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.