Short answer. Nevada lets lawyers who are not in the same firm divide a fee only if the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing, and the total fee is reasonable (Rule 1.5(e) of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct). Rule 1.5(e)(1) reads “Reserved”: the rule’s words state no condition that the division be in proportion to the services each lawyer performs or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility, and no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. No authority we hold construes today’s Rule 1.5(e) or decides whether it permits a referral fee between lawyers; the cases and opinions below applied Nevada’s former Supreme Court Rules or the related rules.
Sources read October 8, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 28, 2026. Rules text is as printed in the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct in the Nevada Legislature’s print (amendments through October 31, 2025) on leg.state.nv.us, fetched October 8, 2026. The former Rule 7.2(k) and 7.2(n) words are as printed in Exhibit A to the Nevada Supreme Court’s order in ADKT 445, fetched October 8, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.
Nevada’s referral fee rules at a glance
| Question | Nevada’s answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Governing rule | Rule 1.5(e), Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct | Nev. RPC 1.5(e) |
| Written client consent | Required in every division: the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing | Rule 1.5(e)(2) |
| Notice to the client | The client’s agreement covers the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and is confirmed in writing | Rule 1.5(e)(2) |
| Proportion to services or joint responsibility | The current rule states none: Rule 1.5(e)(1) reads “Reserved” | Rule 1.5(e)(1) |
| Reasonable total fee | Required | Rule 1.5(e)(3) |
| Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share | None stated in Rule 1.5(e) | Rule 1.5(e) |
| Statutes | Our search of NRS chapter 7 and NRS 686A (October 8, 2026) found none on dividing a fee between lawyers, sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, or paying for a recommendation; no other NRS title was searched exhaustively | NRS chapters 7 and 686A (searched) |
What Rule 1.5(e) says
Rule 1.5(e) of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct governs the division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Its words (Nev. RPC 1.5(e)):
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) Reserved;
(2) The client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(3) The total fee is reasonable.
Our research holds no start date for these words, so this page gives none. When paragraph (e)(1) was reserved, and what it read before, is not held in our research.
Before Nevada’s Rules of Professional Conduct, fee division between lawyers was addressed by former Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 155(5). The former Supreme Court Rules 150-203.5 were repealed as a whole effective May 1, 2006 (ADKT 370). The text of SCR 155(5) is not held in our research; this page gives its words only as the authorities below quote them. Those authorities applied the former rule, not today’s Rule 1.5(e).
What the client must agree to in writing
Every division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm needs the client’s agreement to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement must be confirmed in writing (Rule 1.5(e)(2)). The total fee must also be reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)(3)). No authority we hold applies today’s (e)(2).
Under the former SCR 155(5), as State Bar of Nevada Formal Opinion 4 (1987) and Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2005, 2006) quote it, a written agreement with the client was called for only on the joint-responsibility route (“by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation”), and the client clause was that the client is “advised in writing of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved”. Opinion 4 (advisory) advised that a division must be preceded by full disclosure to the client and agreed to by the client in writing. Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2006), a federal district court order, found it unclear under that rule whether the client must be advised when the lawyers agree or may later ratify. Those authorities applied the former SCR, not today’s words.
What must be disclosed to the client
Today’s client term names the shares: the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing (Rule 1.5(e)(2)). No authority we hold construes it.
The former SCR 155(5), as Opinion 4 and Crockett & Myers quote it, required only that the client be “advised in writing of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved”. The authorities that applied it speak of that clause, not today’s.
Proportionality or joint responsibility
Nevada’s current Rule 1.5(e) states none. Its paragraph (e)(1) reads “(1) Reserved;”, so a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing ((e)(2)), and the total fee is reasonable ((e)(3)). The rule’s words set no condition that the division be in proportion to the services performed or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility, and no percentage. When (e)(1) was reserved, and what it read before, is not held in our research.
The former SCR 155(5) had such a condition. As Opinion 4 (1987) and Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2005) quote it, a division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm could be made only if (a) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; (b) the client is advised in writing of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and (c) the total fee is reasonable. Every authority we hold on that condition applied the former rule, not today’s Rule 1.5(e):
- Opinion 4 (1987, advisory) read SCR 155(5) as permitting a division disproportionate to the services provided the lawyers assume joint responsibility.
- Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2005) found that the Nevada Supreme Court had not addressed how a referral fee is measured “in proportion” to services, and called for briefing on certifying that question to the Nevada Supreme Court; whether any question was certified or answered is not held in our research. Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2006) doubted fifty percent ever would be “in proportion” to a referral but found no Nevada guidance, and held that, assuming an oral referral-fee agreement between lawyers did not comply with SCR 155, Nevada would nevertheless enforce it under Shimrak (1996) against the lawyer who would use his own violation of the ethics rules as a shield. Both are federal district court orders on motions to dismiss, predicting Nevada law on allegations taken as true, not decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court.
No authority we hold decides whether Nevada permits a referral fee between lawyers under today’s Rule 1.5(e).
Referring a case out of Nevada, or into it
Nevada’s Rule 8.5 has no choice-of-law paragraph. It is one sentence (Nev. RPC 8.5):
Rule 8.5. Jurisdiction. A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although engaged in practice elsewhere.
Our research holds no start date for these words, so this page gives none.
Dividing a fee with out-of-state counsel. Rule 1.5(e) governs a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. State Bar of Nevada Formal Opinion 4 (1987, advisory), applying the former SCR 155(5), advised that a lawyer may divide the contingent portion of a fee with the client’s out-of-state counsel provided the requirements of SCR 155(5) (1986) are met and SCR 189 (unauthorized practice) is not violated. That former rule had a proportion-or-joint-responsibility condition and a different client clause, which today’s Rule 1.5(e) does not carry; Opinion 4 does not construe today’s rule.
A cross-border referral in a federal court. Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2006), on a New York lawyer’s referral to a Nevada firm, noted that the New York lawyer was bound by New York’s fee-splitting rule, which it called nearly identical to SCR 155, and applied Nevada’s former rule without a choice-of-law analysis.
Our search (October 8, 2026) found no Nevada statute, court decision or State Bar of Nevada opinion applying Rule 8.5. No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.
Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers
- Payment for referrals. Rule 7.2(a) reads: “(a) Except as allowed under Rule 1.5(e), a lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written or recorded communication permitted by these Rules and may pay the usual charges of a lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.” These words carry no start date in our research. The opening exception (“Except as allowed under Rule 1.5(e)”) is as printed in the Nevada Legislature’s print; the order in ADKT 527 (2018) adopted the paragraph reading “Except as allowed under Rule 7.1(e)”, and no order we hold makes the change, so this page gives no date for that exception. The same bar, without the opening exception, was Rule 7.2(k) until December 13, 2012 and Rule 7.2(n) from then until April 2018; those words are no longer in force. Under the former SCR 196(3), Drakulich (1995) found no clear and convincing evidence that payments to a nonlawyer were for recommending the lawyer rather than for services he performed. Opinion 45 (2011, advisory), citing the former Rule 7.2(k), advised that a lawyer “may not operate an ancillary business that solicits professional employment from clients or provide compensation to employees of the ancillary business for such referrals”.
- Nonlawyers. “(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:” an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons ((a)(1)); a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price ((a)(2)); a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement ((a)(3)); a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter ((a)(4)); and a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer ((a)(5)) (Rule 5.4(a)). These words carry no start date in our research. Nelson (2021) and Szostek (2021) approved discipline on admitted RPC 5.4 violations for sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer; each names RPC 5.4 without a paragraph. In Cohen v. Padda (2022), the Supreme Court of Nevada held that a fee-sharing agreement between attorneys with valid law licenses at the time of the agreement is enforceable even when one attorney is later suspended or disbarred, so long as the suspension or disbarment was unrelated to the cases subject to the agreement and the attorney completed her work on those cases before it. Opinion 49 (2011, advisory) agreed with a California opinion’s reasoning that an attorney providing both legal and non-legal services is not sharing a legal fee. Under the former SCR 188(1): Drakulich (1995) found payments negotiated for services a nonlawyer performed not shown by clear and convincing evidence to be fee sharing; Shimrak (1996) held the rule does not bind a nonlawyer, so a law firm could not avoid paying its investigator his agreed hourly rate plus ten percent of fees on the ground that the contract split fees; and Opinion 5 (1987, advisory) advised that an agreement to contribute all or part of a fee to an organization is fee splitting.
- Statutes. Our search of NRS chapter 7 and NRS 686A (October 8, 2026) found no Nevada statute on dividing a fee between lawyers, on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, or on paying for a recommendation. No other NRS title was searched exhaustively, and this page does not say Nevada has no such statute.
Nevada cases
We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law. Drakulich, Shimrak and both Crockett & Myers orders applied Nevada’s former Supreme Court Rules, not today’s Rules of Professional Conduct. The Crockett & Myers orders are federal district court orders, not decisions of the Nevada Supreme Court. Nelson, Szostek and Cohen applied Rule 5.4; the Rule 5.4(a) words quoted on this page carry no start date, so whether they are the words in force at those decisions’ dates is not established, beyond Cohen’s quotation of the opening clause. Each holding is stated as the decision’s own, on the wording it applied.
| Case | Citation | Year | What it held |
|---|---|---|---|
| In re Discipline of Victor G. Drakulich | 908 P.2d 709; 111 Nev. 1556; 1995 Nev. LEXIS 184 | 1995 | Supreme Court of Nevada, on automatic appeal from a hearing panel’s findings that the lawyer paid a nonlawyer referral fees (in two cases ten percent of the lawyer’s fee) for referring personal-injury clients in 1988, and from its recommended 90-day suspension: on de novo review it held that clear and convincing evidence did not support the panel’s findings, and rejected them and the recommendation. It found no clear and convincing evidence of a violation of SCR 196(3), “the rule which prohibits a lawyer from giving anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services”, and was not persuaded the evidence showed a violation of SCR 188(1), “the rule that prohibits a lawyer from sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer”: the payments were negotiated after the nonlawyer performed investigative and other services and paid from the lawyer’s own funds as fair compensation, and that some equaled or approximated ten percent of the fee did not alter their nature. Even if the payments were a percentage sharing of fees under SCR 188(1), it held a suspension unwarranted because the conduct preceded the Court’s 1992 published anonymous reprimand clarifying that percentage fee sharing with nonlawyers is prohibited. It held, however, that clear and convincing evidence established that the lawyer failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure the nonlawyer’s conduct was compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations (former SCR 187(2)), said he should have explained to the nonlawyer that he could not pay him by a predetermined percentage of his fees, and assessed him the costs of the proceeding. One justice dissented. It applied the former Supreme Court Rules, not today’s Rules 5.4(a) or 7.2(a). |
| Shimrak v. Garcia-Mendoza | 912 P.2d 822; 112 Nev. 246 | 1996 | Supreme Court of Nevada, Case No. 25101: a law firm could not defeat its private investigator’s claim for the agreed compensation (an hourly rate plus ten percent of the attorney’s fees on each case) by arguing that the contract split fees in violation of SCR 188 and that he was in pari delicto. The Supreme Court Rules govern lawyers; the investigator is not bound by SCR 188 (its n.4 quotes: “A lawyer or a law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer....”) and violated no rule or law that applies to him, so he is not in pari delicto, and under the four Magill v. Lewis factors the doctrine should not be applied to deny him agreed-upon compensation for services rendered. It noted (n.5) that this was not a “running” case in which an investigator is paid a portion of fees for bringing in cases. It reversed the dismissal and remanded. Two justices dissented in part and would have held the fee-splitting contract unenforceable as against public policy. It applied the former SCR 188, not today’s Rule 5.4(a). |
| Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP | 401 F. Supp. 2d 1120; 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33032; 2005 WL 3289362 | 2005 | U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, order on a motion to dismiss a New York lawyer’s counterclaims against a Nevada firm for half the fee in a client’s medical-malpractice recovery: it dismissed the claim under the retainer agreement, holding that the client’s discharge of the New York lawyer terminated that agreement and its equal fee-split clause, which did not survive absent explicit language. On the alleged oral agreement to pay half the fees for referring the client, it quoted former SCR 155 (its conditions are set out above) and SCR 196(15). It found that the Nevada Supreme Court had not addressed whether referral fees ever are appropriate under Rule 155 or Rule 196(15), or how a referral fee is measured “in proportion” to services, decided neither, denied the rest of the motion without prejudice, allowed amendment, and called for briefing on certifying those questions to the Nevada Supreme Court. It is a federal trial court’s order on a motion to dismiss, and it applied the former SCR, before those rules were repealed effective May 1, 2006. |
| Crockett & Myers, Ltd. v. Napier, Fitzgerald & Kirby, LLP | 430 F. Supp. 2d 1157; 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30372; 2006 WL 1302250 | 2006 | U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (April 17, 2006), denying the Nevada firm’s motion to dismiss the amended counterclaim on the alleged oral agreement to pay the New York lawyer fifty percent of the fees for the referral: assuming Nevada does not outright forbid referral fees between attorneys, such a division would have to comply with Rule 155 or be against Nevada’s public policy. It doubted fifty percent ever would be “in proportion” to a referral but found no Nevada guidance, and found it unclear whether the client must be advised when the lawyers agree or may later ratify; it did not resolve Rules 155 or 196. It held that, assuming the agreement did not comply, Nevada would nevertheless enforce it under Shimrak (1996): the New York lawyer, bound by a fee-splitting rule it called nearly identical to Rule 155, was at most equal in fault, and the Nevada lawyer may not use his own violation of the ethics rules to shield himself from contractual liability. It also granted leave to amend. It is a federal trial court’s ruling on allegations taken as true, and it applied the former SCR 155 and 196(15). |
| In the Matter of Discipline of Vernon A. Nelson | 478 P.3d 872 | 2021 | Supreme Court of Nevada, order approving a modified conditional guilty plea agreement: on the facts and violations the lawyer admitted, the record established that he violated RPC 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 3.4, 5.4 and 8.4, among other things by forming a partnership with a credit-restoration company and its non-attorney principal to engage in activities that included the unauthorized practice of law, sharing legal fees, and allowing the company to regulate or direct his professional judgment. It imposed a six-month suspension stayed for one year on conditions. It names RPC 5.4 without quoting it or naming a paragraph, and the violation rests on the lawyer’s admission. |
| In the Matter of Discipline of Steven J. Szostek | 479 P.3d 1005 | 2021 | Supreme Court of Nevada, order approving a conditional guilty plea agreement: on the facts and violations the lawyer admitted, the record established that he violated RPC 5.4 (professional independence of lawyer) by sharing legal fees related to a client’s trust with a nonlawyer, and RPC 1.3 and 1.4. It imposed a one-year suspension stayed for two years, running from an earlier stayed suspension. It does not describe the fee arrangement, quote the rule or name a paragraph, and the violation rests on the admission. |
| Cohen v. Padda | 2022 NV 18 | 2022 | Supreme Court of Nevada, en banc (138 Nev., Adv. Op. 18): a fee-sharing agreement between attorneys with valid law licenses at the time of the agreement is enforceable even when one attorney is later suspended or disbarred, so long as the suspension or disbarment was unrelated to the cases subject to the agreement and the attorney completed her work on those cases before it. Quoting RPC 5.4(a) (a “lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer”), it accepted that the suspended attorney was a nonlawyer under the rule during her suspension, but held that preventing her from receiving her share under a dissolution agreement made while both were members of the same firm would not advance RPC 5.4(a)’s policy objective of protecting attorneys’ professional judgment. It said a suspended or disbarred attorney may not receive compensation for work on a case that led to the suspension or disbarment, and that state bar opinions are persuasive but not binding. It reversed summary judgment, vacated the NRCP 68 fee order and remanded. |
State Bar of Nevada ethics opinions
These opinions are formal opinions of the State Bar of Nevada Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Each states that it is advisory only and not binding. Opinions 4 and 5 (1987) applied the former Supreme Court Rules, and Opinion 45 (2011) applied Rule 7.2(k) as lettered before December 13, 2012; none of them construes today’s Rules 1.5(e), 5.4(a) or 7.2(a). As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched.
| Opinion | Year | What it said |
|---|---|---|
| Formal Opinion No. 4 | 1987 | The combined fixed and contingent fee proposed is not unreasonable per se, and a lawyer may divide the contingent portion of the fee with the client’s out-of-state counsel provided the requirements of SCR 155(5) (1986) are met and SCR 189 (unauthorized practice) is not violated. It read SCR 155(5) as permitting divisions disproportionate to the services provided the lawyers assume joint responsibility, and advised that the agreement must be preceded by full disclosure to the client and agreed to by the client in writing. It applied the former SCR 155(5), whose proportion-or-joint-responsibility condition today’s Rule 1.5(e) does not carry ((e)(1) is reserved). |
| Formal Opinion No. 5 | 1987 | Any arrangement whereby an attorney agrees to perform specified legal services for the members of an organization on the express understanding that all or any specified portion of the fee will be contributed to the organization, directly by the client or by the attorney after receipt, constitutes fee splitting in violation of SCR 188, which it quotes as SCR 188(1) (1986): “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer”. So a lawyer may not mail church members an offer to waive half his normal fee for wills and trusts if the client donates the half saved to the church. It applied the former SCR 188(1), not today’s Rule 5.4(a). |
| Formal Opinion No. 45 | 2011 | A lawyer may own and operate an ancillary business providing nonlegal services, but not as a vehicle for improper solicitation. Relying on NRPC 7.3(a), whose terms this page does not state, and citing NRPC 7.2(k) in a footnote, it advised that a lawyer “may not operate an ancillary business that solicits professional employment from clients or provide compensation to employees of the ancillary business for such referrals”. A lawyer may refer a client to the ancillary business only after complying with NRPC 1.8(a), and may continue the representation only with a proper waiver under NRPC 1.7(b). It cites 7.2(k) without quoting it; 7.2(k) was relettered 7.2(n) on December 13, 2012, and 7.2(n) ended in April 2018. |
| Formal Opinion No. 49 | 2011 | An attorney who is also a licensed clinical social worker may practice law and social work under the same limited liability company she owns or operates, provided she does not represent the same clients in both capacities, and must ensure clients understand in which capacity she acts and consent to that scope. Describing RPC 5.4(a) as generally prohibiting lawyers from sharing fees with non-lawyers, it stated: “This Committee agrees with the California committee’s reasoning with regard to the sharing of legal fees”. As Opinion 49 reports it, that California opinion (Formal Opinion 1999-154) noted that an attorney providing both legal and non-legal services to a client was not sharing a legal fee. It does not otherwise construe Rule 5.4(a). |
What our research did not find
- Rules 1.5(e) and (e)(1)–(3), 5.4(a) and (a)(1)–(5), 7.2(a) and 8.5 carry no start date in our research. The 2021 Rule 1.5 order, the 2007 advertising order and ADKT 370’s Exhibit A (the 2006 text) are not held. This page gives no start date for these words, and does not say when Rule 1.5(e)(1) was reserved or what it read before. Rule 7.2(a)’s opening exception (“Except as allowed under Rule 1.5(e)”) is the Legislature print’s; ADKT 527 (2018) reads “Rule 7.1(e)”, and no order we hold makes the change, so this page gives no start date for that exception.
- Today’s Rule 1.5(e) has no proportion-or-joint-responsibility condition ((e)(1) reads “(1) Reserved;”), and this page states none for Nevada. Opinion 4 and Crockett & Myers (2005, 2006) are not cited for today’s conditions: they applied SCR 155(5), which had one, and a different client clause (advised in writing of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved).
- The former SCR 155(5), 188(1), 196(3) and 196(15) carry no stored words in our research. Their link to today’s rules rests on ADKT 370’s repeal of SCR 150-203.5 as a whole, effective May 1, 2006, as printed on the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct page we hold; which current rule replaced which (155(5) by 1.5(e), 188(1) by 5.4(a), 196(3) and 196(15) by 7.2(a)) is our research’s reading of the words the authorities quote. ADKT 370’s Exhibit A is not held. This page gives SCR words only as an authority quotes them, and does not say why two SCR 196 numbers carry the same bar: the SCR’s numbering history is not held.
- Drakulich (1995), Shimrak (1996), Crockett & Myers (D. Nev. 2005 and April 2006) and Opinions 4 and 5 (1987) applied the former Supreme Court Rules, not today’s Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct; Opinion 45 (2011) applied Rule 7.2(k) as lettered before December 13, 2012. Their holdings are stated as their own. This page does not present them as construing today’s Rules 1.5(e), 5.4(a) or 7.2(a), or present the words of Rules 7.2(k) or 7.2(n) (ended December 13, 2012 and April 2018) as in force; 7.2(k) has no start date in our research.
- Rule 5.4(a) is undated, so whether its words quoted here are the version in force when Nelson (2021), Szostek (2021), Cohen (2022) and Opinion 49 (2011) were decided was not assessed. This page does not say they applied these words, beyond Cohen’s quotation of the opening clause.
- Crockett & Myers (2005, 2006) are federal district court orders on motions to dismiss, predicting Nevada law on allegations taken as true; the 2005 order proposed certifying questions to the Nevada Supreme Court, and whether any were certified or answered is not held. They are not Nevada Supreme Court law. Nelson and Szostek approve guilty-plea agreements on admitted violations and name RPC 5.4 without a paragraph. Drakulich’s findings of fee-sharing and referral-payment violations are the hearing panel’s, which the Court rejected, and this page does not cite Drakulich for those violations; the Court’s own SCR 187(2) ruling is stated in the cases table. Drakulich and Shimrak carry dissents.
- Opinions 4, 5, 45 and 49 each state that they are advisory only and not binding, and Cohen calls state bar opinions persuasive, not binding. Opinion 4’s Answer 2 summarizes SCR 155(5) differently from the rule text its Discussion quotes (client consent after full disclosure, and written consent only for a disproportionate division, against “advised in writing of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved”); this page gives the rule words as quoted, not the summary. Opinion 49’s account of California Formal Opinion 1999-154 is its own; that California opinion is not in our research.
- Opinions 45 and 49 are held as machine-read (OCR) text of scans, with stray characters and garbled footnote markers (Opinion 45’s citation of Rule 7.2(k) is its footnote 5), so this page quotes them only from passages our research checked. The April 2006 Crockett & Myers order carries no docket number in our research (the CourtListener docket record names another case, and the stored text prints “2:05-mj-00877”), so this page cites it by its reporter citation.
- Our search (October 8, 2026) found no Nevada statute on dividing a fee between lawyers, on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, on paying for a recommendation, or on choice of law, and no Nevada court decision or State Bar of Nevada opinion applying Rule 8.5. Only NRS chapter 7 and NRS 686A were searched, and no other NRS title exhaustively. No Supreme Court Rule governing the State Bar’s lawyer referral service was found. This page does not say that no such statute, decision or opinion exists.
- Held in our research but not described here: Rule 7.3 and NRS 7.045 (unlawful solicitation of legal business), Drakulich’s SCR 197 ruling, Opinions 7 and 12 (SCR 197), Santos (2020, Rule 5.4), and Crockett & Myers (9th Cir. 2009 and 2011). Rule 1.17 (named by Rule 5.4(a)(2)) and Rule 7.1 (named by ADKT 527’s 7.2(a)) are not in our research for this page either, and this page does not state their terms. Nevada enacts no comments to its Rules (Rule 1.0A), so this page cites no Nevada comment.
- Not read or not obtainable: Matter of Discipline of Schlissel, 401 P.3d 1066 (Nev. 2017), was not obtainable; Discipline of an Anonymous Member of the Bar (1992), which Drakulich cites for publishing that percentage fee sharing with nonlawyers is prohibited, is listed and not read. Our ethics-opinion search screened only the State Bar of Nevada’s index for Opinions 1-61, did not open opinions before 1986, and took only the linked PDF of reissued opinions. The authorities on this page are not the only Nevada authorities on the topic.
- Later treatment of every Nevada authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held, not that it remains good law.
Frequently asked questions
Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Nevada?
Rule 1.5(e) of the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct allows a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm only if the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing, and the total fee is reasonable. Its paragraph (e)(1) reads “Reserved”, and the rule’s words state no condition that the division be in proportion to the services each lawyer performs or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility. The rule’s words do not mention referral fees, and no authority we hold decides whether Nevada permits a referral fee between lawyers under today’s Rule 1.5(e).
Is there a cap on referral fees in Nevada?
Rule 1.5(e) states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. It requires that the total fee be reasonable, and that the client agree to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, with the agreement confirmed in writing. Its paragraph (e)(1) reads “Reserved”; the rule’s words state no condition that the division be in proportion to the services each lawyer performs or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility.
Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Nevada?
Yes. Rule 1.5(e)(2) requires, for every division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm, that the client agree to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and that the agreement be confirmed in writing. The total fee must also be reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)(3)). No authority we hold applies today’s Rule 1.5(e)(2).
Can a Nevada lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?
Rule 1.5(e) governs a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Nevada’s Rule 8.5 has no choice-of-law paragraph; it says that a lawyer admitted to practice in Nevada is subject to Nevada’s disciplinary authority although engaged in practice elsewhere. Our search (October 8, 2026) found no Nevada statute, court decision or State Bar of Nevada opinion applying Rule 8.5, and no authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.
Sources
- Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules 1.5(e), 5.4(a), 7.2(a), 8.5), Nevada Legislature print, amendments through October 31, 2025, fetched October 8, 2026: leg.state.nv.us
- Former Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct 7.2(k) and 7.2(n), Nevada Supreme Court, ADKT 445, Exhibit A, p. 5, fetched October 8, 2026: nvbar.org
- Cases and ethics opinions: linked in the tables above.
More states: Referral fee rules by state.
Disclaimer
This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.