Short answer. Missouri lets lawyers who are not in the same firm divide a fee only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable (Rule 4-1.5(e) of the Missouri Supreme Court Rules). The rule states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. Informal Opinion 2018-05 (advisory) advised that a lawyer may not pay a referral fee to an out-of-state lawyer, not licensed in Missouri, who referred the case, and may divide the fee with that lawyer only if the division complies with Rule 4-1.5(e).
Sources read October 8, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 28, 2026. Rules text is as printed on the Supreme Court of Missouri’s rule pages on courts.mo.gov, captured October 8, 2026. Statutes are as printed on revisor.mo.gov, fetched October 8, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.
Missouri’s referral fee rules at a glance
| Question | Missouri’s answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Governing rule | Rule 4-1.5(e), Missouri Supreme Court Rules (Rule 4, Rules of Professional Conduct) | Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4-1.5(e) |
| Written client consent | Required in every division: the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing | Rule 4-1.5(e)(2) |
| Notice to the client | The client agrees to the association, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; the rule’s words do not require that the client be told each lawyer’s share or the amount of the division | Rule 4-1.5(e)(2) |
| Proportion to services or joint responsibility | Required: the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation | Rule 4-1.5(e)(1) |
| Reasonable total fee | Required | Rule 4-1.5(e)(3) |
| Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share | None stated in Rule 4-1.5(e) | Rule 4-1.5(e) |
| Statutes | RSMo 484.150 makes it unlawful for any licensed attorney in Missouri to divide any fees or compensation received in the practice of law or in doing law business with any person not a licensed attorney, any firm not wholly composed of licensed attorneys, or any association or corporation. RSMo 436.556(1)–(2) provide that no consumer legal funding company shall pay or offer to pay referral fees or other consideration to any attorney or law firm (among others) for referring a consumer to the company, or accept such consideration from one. Our statute search found none on dividing a fee between lawyers | RSMo 484.150; RSMo 436.556 |
What Rule 4-1.5(e) says
Rule 4-1.5(e) of the Missouri Supreme Court Rules governs the division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Its words (Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4-1.5(e)); (e), (e)(1) and (e)(2) are in force since July 1, 2007, and our research holds no start date for (e)(3):
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
These words superseded the former Rule 4-1.5(e) on July 1, 2007, under the order of March 1, 2007 repealing and re-adopting Rule 4. The former words are not held as text. As Londoff (1999), Neilson (2005), Gary Green (2006) and Eng (8th Cir. 2010) quote them, the former (e)(1) read “or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation”, and the former (e)(2) was that “the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved”. Neither clause is in today’s words, and the decisions and opinions that applied the former wording did not construe today’s (e)(1)–(3).
What the client must agree to in writing
Every division between lawyers not in the same firm needs the client’s agreement to the association, confirmed in writing (Rule 4-1.5(e)(2), in force since July 1, 2007). The rule’s words do not say who confirms the agreement in writing, and do not name the share each lawyer will receive. No decision we hold construes today’s (e)(2). Informal Opinion 2018-05 (advisory) advised that a lawyer may divide a fee with a referring out-of-state lawyer only if the division complies with Rule 4-1.5(e), including that the client agrees to the association, confirmed in writing.
Before July 1, 2007 the words differed. As Londoff, Neilson, Gary Green and Eng quote the former rule, a written agreement with the client was required on the joint-responsibility route only, and the client clause was that “the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved”. Under that former wording, Londoff v. Vuylsteke (1999) held that the rule requires a written agreement with the client in which each lawyer assumes joint responsibility, and that a few hours of work before the referral and possible liability for malpractice or costs do not satisfy it; Eng (8th Cir. 2010) held that the written agreement itself must inform the client that each lawyer will assume joint responsibility, not just that the lawyers will split the fee. Those holdings rest on the former words, not on today’s (e)(2).
What must be disclosed to the client
Today’s client term is that the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing (Rule 4-1.5(e)(2)). Its words do not require that the client be told each lawyer’s share or the amount of the division. The quoted words of Rules 4-7.2(c) and 4-5.4(a) and of RSMo 484.150 contain no disclosure term.
Under the former rule, as Londoff, Neilson and Eng quote it, the client had to be “advised of and [not] object to the participation of all the lawyers involved”. Eng (8th Cir. 2010) noted that an alleged share of the fee from a client the referring firm never communicated with also ran afoul of that clause. Applying the former rule, Informal Opinion 960054 (advisory) advised that a referral arrangement providing neither for the referring firm to remain responsible for the matter nor for the client to consent would violate Rule 4-1.5(e), and Informal Opinion 940154 (advisory) advised that a 10%/90% division to which the client had consented would not violate it.
Proportionality or joint responsibility
Every division of a fee between lawyers not in the same firm must meet all three conditions of Rule 4-1.5(e): the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation ((e)(1)); the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing ((e)(2)); and the total fee is reasonable ((e)(3)). (e), (e)(1) and (e)(2) are in force since July 1, 2007; (e)(3) carries no date in our research. No stored word sets a percentage or cap on any share.
Decisions on the former wording. Before July 1, 2007, joint responsibility was assumed “by written agreement with the client” (as Londoff and Eng quote the former (e)(1)). Applying that former wording, Missouri courts held that agreements between attorneys from different firms to divide a fee are acceptable only if based on a sharing of services or responsibility, that the rule has the force and effect of law, and that an agreement that does not comply is unenforceable (Londoff 1999, Neilson 2005, Gary Green 2006). Eng (8th Cir. 2010), a federal court’s reading of Missouri law, also held the agreement before it unenforceable and barred the fraud, misrepresentation and unjust-enrichment counterclaims resting on it. Neilson held that a lawyer who wants a share must actually participate in the handling of the case or assume a financial and ethical responsibility for it; Londoff, quoting McFarland v. George (1958), and Eng held that merely referring a case and doing nothing further is not service or responsibility. Holaday (2020) restated, quoting Gary Green, that a non-complying agreement is unenforceable, but decided its case on other grounds. No decision we hold holds a fee agreement unenforceable under today’s (e)(1)–(3).
Who the rule reaches. Rule 4-1.5(e) does not apply when the lawyers are in the same firm (Welch 2003, on the former wording; Beck 2010; Brady 2017, where lawyers sharing office space presented themselves to the public in a way that suggested they were a firm). Gary Green (2006, former wording) held that the rule applies to a division between lawyers who were once in the same firm but have separated. Vance (2010) held that it does not apply to fees earned by a departing member before her separation, even if received after; Vance quoted today’s words for a 2004 separation and relied on Comment [8], added to Rule 4-1.5 in 2007, presuming the comment clarified rather than changed the rule. Holaday (2020) held that damages for a departing lawyer’s deception and non-disclosure are not a “division” of fees under the rule.
Informal opinions. The Office of Legal Ethics Counsel advised that Rule 4-1.5(e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a firm (2019-04); that if a lawyer’s association with a firm is accurately characterized as Of Counsel, the rule does not regulate the division of a fee between the firm and that lawyer, though the fee must comply with the rest of Rule 4-1.5 (2020-12); that a fee divided under Rule 4-1.5(e) may be divided with a lawyer later disbarred if that lawyer’s share is for work performed while licensed in Missouri, even though payment is made after the disbarment (2015-05); and, applying the former rules, that a lawyer may share fees with a suspended attorney as long as that attorney earned the fees before the suspension (20000195). Informal Opinion 2018-05 advised that a lawyer may not pay a referral fee to an out-of-state lawyer, not licensed in Missouri, who referred the case, and may divide the fee with that lawyer only under Rule 4-1.5(e). These opinions are advisory and not binding.
Referring a case out of Missouri, or into it
Missouri’s choice-of-law rule, Rule 4-8.5(b), says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Missouri exercises its disciplinary authority (Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4-8.5(b)). Our research holds no start date for its words: the order of March 1, 2007 prints them, and an amendment of March 9, 2005 (effective January 1, 2006), whose order is not held, may have set them.
(b) In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction.
A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.
Receiving a case into Missouri. Informal Opinion 2018-05 (advisory) advised that a Missouri lawyer may not pay a referral fee to an out-of-state lawyer, not licensed in Missouri, who referred the case, because Rule 4-7.2(c) prohibits giving anything of value for recommending the lawyer’s services, and may divide the contingent fee with that lawyer only if the division complies with Rule 4-1.5(e): in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility; the client agrees to the association, confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable. Applying the former rules, Informal Opinion 960178 (advisory) advised that an out-of-state lawyer not licensed in Missouri who referred a workers’ compensation case would be receiving a referral fee, not a fee based on the proportion of work performed or joint responsibility under Rule 4-1.5(e).
A federal court’s reading. In Eng (8th Cir. 2010), the court applied Missouri’s Rule 4-1.5(e), as it read in 2006 when the agreement was made, to a Michigan firm’s referral agreement with a Missouri firm, and noted that the agreement appeared valid under Michigan’s rule, without discussing Rule 4-8.5 or saying why Missouri’s rule governed.
No Missouri statute, court decision or informal opinion applying Rule 4-8.5(b) to a question on dividing fees or paying for referrals was found (searched October 8, 2026). No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.
Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers
- Payment for referrals. “(c) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services, except that:” “(1) a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule 4-7.2;” “(2) a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of advertising, written communication, or other notification required in connection with the sale of a law practice as permitted by Rule 4-1.17; and” “(3) a lawyer may pay the usual charges of a qualified lawyer referral service registered under Rule 4-9.1 or other not-for-profit legal services organization.” (Rule 4-7.2(c), courts.mo.gov). (c)(2) and (c)(3) are in force since July 1, 2007; (c) and (c)(1) carry no date in our research. In In re Agron (2024), the Supreme Court of Missouri found that a lawyer violated Rule 4-7.2(c) by paying an unregistered pay-per-lead referral service and a runner for client referrals, and suspended him. Informal Opinion 2025-05 (advisory) advised that paying an online marketing company a dollar amount per referral, though it calls the charge advertising fees, is permitted under Rule 4-7.2(c) only if the company is a “qualified service” registered with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. Informal opinions applying the former Rule 4-7.2(c) are listed in the table below.
- Nonlawyers. “(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:” “(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons;” “(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer;” “(3) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4-1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-upon purchase price;” “(4) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and” “(5) a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained, or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter.” (Rule 4-5.4(a), courts.mo.gov). None of (a) or (a)(1)–(5) carries a date in our research. Grillo (2015) held that a nonlawyer’s alleged agreement with a lawyer to share a law firm’s profits equally violated RSMo 484.150, reading (a)(4)’s profit-sharing words as a limited exception. Informal Opinion 2023-03 (advisory) advised that a lawyer may continue after retirement to receive fees earned before it.
- Statutes. RSMo 484.150.1: “1. It shall be unlawful for any licensed attorney in the state of Missouri to divide any fees or compensation received by him in the practice of law or in doing law business with any person not a licensed attorney or any firm not wholly composed of licensed attorneys, or any association or corporation, and any person, firm, association or corporation violating this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction therefor shall be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than five hundred dollars and costs of prosecution, which fine shall be paid into the treasury of the state of Missouri.” Under 484.150.2, any violator is subject to be sued for treble the amount of all sums paid in violation by the person paying the fees or compensation, and if that person does not sue for or recover it within two years from the date of the division, the state of Missouri shall sue for and recover the treble amount; under 484.150.3, the attorney general or the prosecuting attorney of any county or city in which service of process may be had upon the person liable shall institute the suits. The Supreme Court of Missouri held an agreement by a salaried staff attorney to hand court-awarded fees to the nonprofit that employed him unenforceable under 484.150.1 and the then disciplinary rule (ACLU v. Miller, 1991). In Nationwide Transfer (2023), the circuit court concluded that an agreement for companies that referred customers to a law firm to receive two-thirds of its legal fees was unenforceable under § 484.150; the Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the companies had no right to any portion of the legal fees. RSMo 436.556 reads: “436.556. Prohibited acts. — No consumer legal funding company shall:” “(1) Pay or offer to pay commissions, referral fees, or other forms of consideration to any attorney, law firm, medical provider, chiropractor, or physical therapist or any of their employees for referring a consumer to the company;” “(2) Accept any commissions, referral fees, rebates, or other forms of consideration from an attorney, law firm, medical provider, chiropractor, or physical therapist or any of their employees;”. Its words name the consumer legal funding company as the one that shall not, and no authority we hold applies the section. None of these statute parts carries an effective date in our research.
Missouri cases
We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law. Londoff, Welch, Neilson, Gary Green and Eng applied Rule 4-1.5(e) as it read before July 1, 2007, and ACLU v. Miller applied RSMo 484.150.1 and the former Code’s Disciplinary Rule 3-102; their holdings are stated as their own, on the wording they applied, not as readings of today’s rule. The decisions are read from CourtListener copies, not the courts’ own; Holaday, Nationwide Transfer and In re Agron are cited by docket number.
| Case | Citation | Year | What it held |
|---|---|---|---|
| American Civil Liberties Union/Eastern Missouri Fund v. Miller | 803 S.W.2d 592 | 1991 | Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc: a nonprofit sued its former salaried staff attorney for court-awarded attorneys’ fees he received for his work, under his employment term that fees be “handed over to the organization.” Assuming arguendo that he had a binding contractual obligation to return the fees, the Court held the agreement unenforceable, because § 484.150.1 RSMo 1986 and Disciplinary Rule 3-102, in effect at the time of the fee award (“[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer”), apply to it; the prohibition against fee-splitting does not infringe First Amendment rights. The conversion and unjust-enrichment counts failed because the organization had no enforceable right to the fees. It reversed summary judgment for the organization and held the lawyer entitled to summary judgment. It applied the statute and the Code’s DR 3-102; its footnote 2 only observes that the then-current Rule 5.4 “contains identical language”, and it did not construe today’s Rule 4-5.4(a). Two judges dissented. |
| Londoff v. Vuylsteke | 996 S.W.2d 553 | 1999 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed judgment against a disbarred former lawyer who referred a wrongful-death case and sued for half the fee under an oral fee-splitting agreement. It held that agreements between attorneys from different law firms to divide a fee are acceptable only if based on a sharing of services or responsibility and must comply with Rule 4-1.5(e), which has the force and effect of law; that the rule requires a written agreement with the client in which each lawyer assumes joint responsibility, so a few hours of work before the referral and possible liability for malpractice or costs do not satisfy it; that “responsibility” relates to actual participation in or handling of the case (quoting McFarland 1958); and that, the arrangement being unenforceable as a matter of law, a failure to plead a proportional division of services or a written agreement with the client bars the claim. It applied the pre-2007 Rule 4-1.5(e), which it quotes; it did not construe today’s (e)(1)–(2). |
| Welch v. Davis | 114 S.W.3d 285 | 2003 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, per curiam, confirming an arbitration award under an agreement between a lawyer and his firm’s former associate, rejected the claim that the agreement violated Rule 4-1.5(e): the rule imposes qualifications on dividing a fee only when “lawyers who are not in the same firm” divide it, and lawyers who held themselves out to their clients and practiced together as a single, collective business entity were in the same firm, whatever their business relationship (independent contractor or not). It applied the pre-2007 Rule 4-1.5(e), which it quotes (n.2). |
| Neilson v. McCloskey | 186 S.W.3d 285 | 2005 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed dismissal of a lawyer’s claims against a lawyer of another firm under an alleged agreement that the representation would be joint and the fee divided evenly, because after five amendments he alleged neither that they were in the same firm, nor that the fee was to be divided in proportion to each one’s efforts, nor that there was a written agreement with the client that each would assume joint responsibility. It held that “an agreement to share attorney fees that does not comply with Rule 4-1.5(e) is unenforceable”, and that a lawyer who wants a share of the fee must actually participate in handling the case or assume a financial and ethical responsibility for it. It applied the pre-2007 Rule 4-1.5(e) and its Comment, which it quotes. |
| Law Offices of Gary Green, P.C. v. Morrissey | 210 S.W.3d 421 | 2006 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, affirmed dismissal of a firm’s claims against a lawyer it formerly employed, under a separation agreement dividing fees (50/50 or 40%) in cases that originated while he was employed and that he kept. It held that by its language Rule 4-1.5(e) applies to an agreement dividing fees between lawyers who at one time were in the same firm but have separated, so the firm had to plead facts showing either a division in proportion to the services performed or that each lawyer assumed joint responsibility by written agreement with the client, and leave to amend was properly refused because the proposed amendment showed neither. It applied the pre-2007 Rule 4-1.5(e), which it quotes. Vance (2010) later read Green as concerning an agreement made after the separation. |
| Beck v. Patton | 309 S.W.3d 436 | 2010 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, reversed summary judgment for a lawyer against another who claimed a share of a fee under a partnership or ad hoc relationship, because a genuine issue of fact remained whether the two held themselves out to clients and practiced as a single firm. It held that Rule 4-1.5(e) applies only to attorney fee agreements made between associated, yet distinct, attorneys (or law firms) and the client, and does not apply to the partnership relationship claimed (following Welch); it expressed no opinion on whether any fee-splitting agreement between them was enforceable. It quotes today’s 4-1.5(e) words (2009 Rules). |
| Eng v. Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, PLC | 611 F.3d 428 | 2010 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri law (a federal court’s reading of it), affirmed summary judgment that a Michigan firm’s alleged agreement to share the fee in a wrongful-death case it referred to a Missouri firm was unenforceable as a matter of law. There was no written agreement between the referring firm and the clients; even if its letter to one client were a written agreement, Rule 4-1.5(e)(1) required that the written agreement itself inform the client that each lawyer will assume joint responsibility, not just that the lawyers will split the fee; and occasional calls with one client and the client’s uncle did not amount to joint responsibility. Because the agreement was unenforceable, the referring firm’s counterclaims for fraud, misrepresentation and unjust enrichment also failed (one judge dissenting on the fraudulent-inducement claim). It applied Rule 4-1.5(e) as it read in 2006, when the agreement was made (the pre-2007 words, requiring joint responsibility “by written agreement with the client”); its n.6 notes the 2007 revision, which it did not apply. |
| Vance v. Griggs | 324 S.W.3d 471 | 2010 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, reversed in part the dismissal of a lawyer’s claims against two members who withdrew from her firm in 2004. It held that Rule 4-1.5(e) does not apply to attorney’s fees earned by a departing member of a law firm prior to her separation from the firm, even if the fees are received after the separation, relying on Comment [8] added to Rule 4-1.5 in 2007, which it presumed clarified rather than changed the rule and so could aid assessment of earlier petitions; for work done after the separation, it found Informal Opinions 20020003 and 20000219 helpful in indicating that fees to be shared must comply with Rule 4-1.5(e). It affirmed dismissal of her bare claim to interpleaded fees. It quotes today’s 4-1.5(e) words, though the separation was in 2004. |
| Grillo v. Global Patent Group LLC | 471 S.W.3d 351 | 2015 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, affirmed summary judgment against a nonlawyer who alleged an agreement with a lawyer to share a law firm’s profits and losses equally. It held that there is no inherent conflict between section 484.150.1’s general prohibition on profit-sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers and Rule 4-5.4(a)(4)’s limited exception allowing lawyers to include nonlawyer employees in compensation or retirement plans, because by qualifying that exception the Supreme Court intended profit-sharing arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers otherwise to be prohibited; because the alleged agreement violated section 484.150, the contract claim, and the claims based on that unenforceable agreement, failed. In a footnote it held the agreement also unenforceable under Rule 4-5.4(b). It quoted 4-5.4(a)(4) in the words quoted on this page (the alleged agreement ran 2007-2011). |
| Brady v. Starke | 517 S.W.3d 28 | 2017 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed judgment enforcing a fee-sharing agreement between two lawyers who shared office space. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that they presented themselves to the public in a way that suggested they were a firm, so they were in the same firm and Rule 4-1.5(e) did not apply; no finding that they held themselves out as a single collective entity or partnership was required. It did not reach whether the agreement met Rule 4-1.5(e). It quotes today’s 4-1.5(e), noting that Welch examined a previous version and that the later changes do not affect the analysis. |
| Stephen W. Holaday, P.C. v. Tieman, Spencer & Hicks, L.L.C. | No. WD82792 (slip op.) | 2020 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, affirmed damages for breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference against a lawyer who, before withdrawing from his firm in 2015, misstated the value of two contingent-fee cases so that they were left off a list of cases whose future fees would be divided with the firm. It held that the firm’s claims were not claims on a fee-splitting agreement; that Comment [8] to Rule 4-1.5 made clear the rule should not be applied; and that damages for deception and non-disclosure are not a “division” of fees under Rule 4-1.5(e), so they could be awarded without regard to it. It quotes today’s 4-1.5(e). |
| Nationwide Transfer LLC v. Neally Law, LLC | No. SD37267 (slip op.) | 2023 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District: timeshare-exit companies referred customers to a law firm under an agreement that, in “Type B” matters, the firm would remit two-thirds of its earned legal fees to them. The circuit court concluded that agreement unenforceable under § 484.150 and public policy and denied the companies’ unjust-enrichment claim. Affirming, the Court of Appeals held, following ACLU v. Miller, that Missouri law, disciplinary rules and public policy forbid fee-splitting arrangements between an attorney and a lay agency, so the companies had no right to any portion of the legal fees their customers paid the firm and conferred no benefit on it. It applied RSMo 484.150 (RSMo 2016). |
| In re Agron | No. SC100543 (slip op.) | 2024 | Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, in a discipline on stipulated facts: a lawyer paid an unregistered pay-per-lead referral service and a runner for client referrals in 2020-2021. The Court found he violated Rule 4-7.2(c), neither payee being qualified; it also found violations of Rules 4-9.1(b), 4-5.3, 4-8.1(a), 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d) (false statements to disciplinary counsel being the most serious), and suspended him indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for 12 months. It applied the 2023 Rules. This page quotes Rule 4-7.2(c)(3) above, not the decision’s paraphrase of it. |
Missouri informal ethics opinions
These are informal advisory opinions of the Office of Legal Ethics Counsel. The stored pages are written summaries of select informal opinions and say they are advisory and not binding, so each entry states only the advice the office gave, not a holding or a rule. Opinions numbered before 2017, and Opinion 2015-05, print no date, and we give none. Each opinion marked “rules before July 1, 2007” applied the rules as they read before the July 1, 2007 re-adoption (including the former Rule 4-10.1), and does not construe today’s words. As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched.
| Opinion | Date | What the office advised |
|---|---|---|
| Informal Opinion 2015-05 | No date printed | A lawyer who agreed under Rule 4-1.5(e) to divide a fee with a lawyer of another firm, who was disbarred before settlement, may divide the fee with the disbarred lawyer if that lawyer’s share is for work performed while licensed in Missouri, even though payment is made after the disbarment. |
| Informal Opinion 2017-05 | 2017 | Rule 4-5.4(a) prohibits sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer, with exceptions including (a)(2) for a lawyer who completes unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; a lawyer who is not that lawyer may not pay a deceased lawyer’s attorney’s lien to someone claiming a portion of the fees on the deceased lawyer’s behalf where no estate has been opened. |
| Informal Opinion 2018-05 | 2018 | A lawyer may not pay a referral fee to an out-of-state lawyer who is not licensed in Missouri and referred the case, because Rule 4-7.2(c) prohibits giving anything of value for recommending the lawyer’s services, and may divide the contingent fee with that lawyer only if the division complies with Rule 4-1.5(e): in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility; the client agrees to the association, confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable. |
| Informal Opinion 2019-04 | 2019 | On disputes when a lawyer leaves a firm: Rule 4-1.5(e) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a firm. |
| Informal Opinion 2020-12 | 2020 | If a lawyer’s association with a firm is accurately characterized as Of Counsel, Rule 4-1.5(e) does not regulate the division of a fee between the firm and that lawyer, though the fee must comply with the rest of Rule 4-1.5. |
| Informal Opinion 2023-03 | April 26, 2023 | Under Rules 4-1.5 and 4-5.4(a), a lawyer may continue after retirement, on active or inactive status, to receive fees earned before retirement, and, quoting Rule 4-5.4(a)(1), future payments may be made to the lawyer’s heirs so long as it is permissible at law; the office gave no advice on the legal mechanism. |
| Informal Opinion 2025-05 | July 25, 2025 | A lawyer may pay an online marketing company that forwards potential clients and charges a dollar amount per referral, though it calls the charge advertising fees, only if the company is a “qualified service” registered with the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel; Rule 4-7.2(c) permits paying the fee only to such a service, and using a service that is not violates Rules 4-7.2(c) and 4-9.1(b). It advised contacting that office before using the service, and relies on In re Agron. |
| Informal Opinion 930090 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer may offer clients a monthly-retainer plan and hire employees or independent contractors to market it, paid by salary and bonuses or a flat fee or commission, but neither may be paid on the basis of the amount of fees paid to or billed by the attorney, which would violate Rule 5.4, fee splitting with a non-lawyer. |
| Informal Opinion 940002 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | Among answers on a financial advisor firm’s dealings with a lawyer: the firm’s referrals of clients to the lawyer are acceptable as long as that is all that is involved, with no relationship other than attorney and client, because Rule 7.2(c) prohibits a lawyer from giving anything of value in exchange for a referral. Its other answers rest on rules not described here. |
| Informal Opinion 940024 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer and a financial planner may not agree to recommend each other exclusively, because that exclusive arrangement would involve giving something of value in exchange for referrals in violation of Rule 4-7.2(c), but no violation occurs if each merely expresses a willingness to accept referrals without any obligation. Its answer under the solicitation rule is not described here. |
| Informal Opinion 940135 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer giving a testimonial for another business person, in the hope that the person will refer clients, would involve giving something of value for referrals in violation of Rule 4-7.2(c). Its answer under another rule is not described here. |
| Informal Opinion 940154 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | Where a lawyer associated a lawyer in the distant state of the accident, remained involved while the other lawyer tried the case, the total fee was one third, and the client consented to a division of 10% to the lawyer and 90% to the other lawyer, the arrangement would not violate Rule 4-1.5(e). It does not say which basis of (e)(1) it rested on. |
| Informal Opinion 940162 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer may share fees from the partnership’s outstanding contingency cases with a former partner, now a judge, to the extent the fees were earned during the partnership, apportioned under the partnership agreement. |
| Informal Opinion 950043 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer may pay a not-for-profit attorney referral service a fee that is a percentage of the attorney’s fees collected on a case it referred, because Rule 4-7.2(c) then authorized payment of “the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.” That wording is not today’s (c)(3). |
| Informal Opinion 950146 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A program crediting a client a small amount for referring a new client would violate Rule 4-7.2(c), which prohibits giving anything of value in exchange for recommending the lawyer’s services. |
| Informal Opinion 950155 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer participating as a member merchant in a credit card program that refers customers to merchants for a 20% fee would violate Rule 4-5.4(a), which prohibits fee splitting with a non-lawyer, and Rule 4-7.2(c), which prohibits giving anything of value in exchange for a referral. |
| Informal Opinion 950210 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer’s paying a for-profit company that refers callers to an 800 number would violate Rule 4-7.2(c). |
| Informal Opinion 960054 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | An arrangement in which one firm refers clients to another and receives a portion of the client’s retainer on a schedule set by the two firms, with no provision for the referring firm to remain responsible for the matter or for the client to consent, would violate the requirements for permissible fee sharing under Rule 4-1.5(e). |
| Informal Opinion 960126 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer may make a requested voluntary contribution of 10% of the fee to an organization that refers clients only if it is a qualified lawyer referral service registered under the former Rule 4-10.1; otherwise the arrangement would violate Rule 4-7.2(c). |
| Informal Opinion 960134 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | An advertising program in which an operator passes calls to participating lawyers in rotation, for a flat monthly fee regardless of calls or cases, is a lawyer referral service, and under Rule 4-7.2(c)(3) a lawyer may participate only if it is a qualified service registered under the former Rule 4-10.1. The (c)(3) words it applied are not held. |
| Informal Opinion 960178 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | An out-of-state lawyer not licensed in Missouri who referred a workers’ compensation case would be receiving a referral fee, not a fee based on the proportion of work performed or joint responsibility under Rule 4-1.5(e), and referral fees were prohibited under Rule 4-7.2(c) unless the referring entity was a registered referral service under the former Rule 4-10.1. |
| Informal Opinion 960218 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer who accepts credits from a business that refers clients for a fee would violate Rule 7.2(c) unless the program becomes registered as a qualified lawyer referral service under the former Rule 4-10.1; without more detail the office could not determine whether the credit system would involve fee splitting prohibited by Rule 4-5.4. |
| Informal Opinion 970190 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer paying a private investigation group an hourly rate when a client chooses the lawyer from a list the group provides would violate Rule 4-7.2(c), which prohibits giving something of value in exchange for a recommendation of the lawyer’s services. |
| Informal Opinion 970218 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer’s participation in an 800-number cooperative marketing program run by a company registered as a lawyer referral service under the former Rule 4-10.1 would not violate Rule 4-7.2(c). Its reference note tells the reader to review Rule 4-9.1 and In re Agron. |
| Informal Opinion 970238 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | Clients’ businesses distributing a lawyer’s coupons would not violate Rule 4-7.2(c) if the lawyer only pays for the coupons, but would if the lawyer has any understanding that the businesses will receive anything of value, including discounts, waiver of fees or referrals to those businesses. |
| Informal Opinion 20000130 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | Asked whether a lawyer referral service may collect a percentage of the fees on cases it refers, given Rule 4-1.5(e): under Rule 4-7.2(c) a lawyer may pay the fees of a lawyer referral service registered under the former Rule 4-10.1. Its reference note says it rests on Rule 4-10.1 as in effect before July 1, 2007. |
| Informal Opinion 20000189 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A network forwarding consumer collection cases among member firms for three percent of net collections appears to be a lawyer referral service, and under Rule 4-7.2(c) a lawyer may not give anything of value in exchange for a referral unless the service is registered under the former Rule 4-10.1. Its reference note says it rests on Rule 4-10.1 as in effect before July 1, 2007. |
| Informal Opinion 20000195 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A lawyer handling a case previously handled by a suspended attorney may share fees with the suspended attorney, as long as that attorney earned the fees prior to suspension. It is filed under Rules 4-1.5 and 4-5.4; its answer names no rule. |
| Informal Opinion 20020003 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A firm and a departing partner may honor their prior agreement to share expenses and contingent fees 50/50 on cases whose clients follow the departing lawyer only if all requirements of Rule 4-1.5(e) are met; since the arrangement was not under the proportionality approach, they must comply with the requirement that “by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation”, which includes all forms of professional responsibility. Those are the pre-2007 words it quotes, which today’s (e)(1) does not contain. |
| Informal Opinion 20060069 | No date printed (rules before July 1, 2007) | A compensation schedule based on the amount of the recovery, for a non-attorney acting independently to prepare and settle insurance claims for attorneys, would constitute fee sharing with a non-attorney, which Rule 4-5.4 prohibits. Its answer under another rule is not described here. |
What our research did not find
- Rule 4-1.5(e)(3), Rule 4-5.4(a) and (a)(1)–(5), Rule 4-7.2(c) and (c)(1), Rule 4-8.5(b), (b)(1) and (b)(2), RSMo 484.150.1–.3 and RSMo 436.556(1)–(2) carry no effective date in our research: the orders or acts that set their words are not held, so this page gives no start date for any of them. Only Rule 4-1.5(e), (e)(1) and (e)(2) and Rule 4-7.2(c)(2) and (c)(3) are dated, from July 1, 2007. RSMo 484.150’s heading holds no words of its own.
- The former words of Rules 4-1.5, 4-1.5(e) and 4-1.5(e)(1), 4-5.4 and 4-5.4(a), and 4-7.2(c) and (c)(3) are not held as text. The former Rule 4-1.5 and 4-1.5(e) were superseded by today’s 4-1.5(e) on July 1, 2007 (order of March 1, 2007 repealing and re-adopting Rule 4; Eng n.6: “In 2007, Rule 4-1.5(e) was revised”). The former Rules 4-5.4, 4-5.4(a), 4-7.2(c) and (c)(3) are tied to today’s 4-5.4(a) and 4-7.2(c) with no date: each rule’s history note lists several amendments (4-5.4: 1994, 1995, 2007; 4-7.2: 1995, 1996, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2010), and which one ended the words each authority applied is not held. This page gives no date on which the former 4-5.4 or 4-7.2(c) words those authorities applied ended, and states those words only as an authority quotes them, attributed to it.
- Londoff (1999), Welch (2003), Neilson (2005), Gary Green (2006) and Eng (8th Cir. 2010, agreement made in 2006) applied the pre-2007 Rule 4-1.5(e), whose (e)(1) required joint responsibility “by written agreement with the client” and whose (e)(2) required that the client be “advised of and [not] object to” the lawyers’ participation; today’s (e)(1)–(3) differ. This page does not present them as construing today’s Rule 4-1.5(e), or present either of those requirements as today’s law. ACLU v. Miller (1991) applied RSMo 484.150.1 and the Code’s Disciplinary Rule 3-102, noting only (n.2) that the then-current Rule 5.4 “contains identical language”; it did not construe today’s Rule 4-5.4(a). Informal Opinions 930090, 940002, 940024, 940135, 940154, 940162, 950043, 950146, 950155, 950210, 960054, 960126, 960134, 960178, 960218, 970190, 970218, 970238, 20000130, 20000189, 20000195, 20020003 and 20060069 applied the rules before the July 1, 2007 re-adoption, including the former Rule 4-10.1; this page does not present them as construing today’s words. Vance (2010) quoted today’s 4-1.5(e) words for a 2004 separation and applied Comment [8] (added 2007) to it, presuming the comment clarified rather than changed the rule.
- Rule 4-7.3 and the referral-service rules are not part of what this page relies on. The former Rule 4-7.3(b) (in-person solicitation) is linked by Informal Opinions 940002, 940024, 990116 and 20040003, and today’s Rule 4-7.3 by Opinions 2018-13 and 2025-03. The former Rule 4-10.1 (lawyer referral service registration) is linked by Informal Opinions 20000130, 20000189, 960126, 960134, 960178, 960218 and 970218, and 4-10.1(e) by Opinion 20040033. Today’s Rule 4-9.1 is held (In re Agron and Opinion 2025-05 link 4-9.1(b) and (d)) but is not part of this page’s research. The 2005 order’s Rule 4-7.2(c)(3), recorded in our research as in force to July 1, 2007, read “registered under Rule 4-10.1” where today’s (c)(3) reads “registered under Rule 4-9.1”. This page does not state the terms of Rules 4-7.3, 4-9.1 or 4-10.1 (registration, qualification or fee requirements). Opinions that name both Rule 4-7.2(c) and Rule 4-10.1 are described here through Rule 4-7.2(c) only.
- Held in our research but not part of what this page relies on, so this page does not state their terms: the Comments to Rule 4-1.5, including Comments [7] and [8], which Vance, Holaday and Opinion 2019-04 apply; Rule 4-1.0(c) and its Comment [2], which Brady applies; Rule 4-5.4(b)–(c) (Grillo also held the agreement void under 4-5.4(b)); Rules 4-5.3, 4-8.1 and 4-8.4 (In re Agron); Rule 4-7.2(d); and Rule 4-1.17, named by Rules 4-5.4(a)(3) and 4-7.2(c)(2). Informal Opinions 2010-0005, 2010-0029 and 2011-02 apply the whole of today’s Rule 4-5.4 and are not described here.
- RSMo 436.556: its lead-in (“No consumer legal funding company shall:”) and (1)–(2) are quoted; (1)–(2) bind the consumer legal funding company, not lawyers. RSMo 436.556(4) (a consumer legal funder referring a customer to a specific attorney) is not loaded. No authority we hold applies RSMo 436.556; this page states what (1)–(2) say, not how they have been applied.
- Our searches (October 8, 2026) found no Missouri statute on dividing a fee between lawyers, on solicitation, or on choice of law (revisor.mo.gov: the chapter 484 table and word searches), and no Missouri court decision or informal opinion applying Rule 4-8.5(b) to a question on this page’s topic. Discovery screened 324 informal opinions and read 50; mo-legal-ethics.org holds informal opinions only, and no formal-opinion index was found; Opinions 930106, 980022 and 20040044 print only rule tags and a “Withdrawn” mark and were not read. This page says only what these searches found, not that no such statute, decision or opinion exists, and does not say the authorities here are the only Missouri authorities on the topic.
- Cited by the authorities here but not held, or deferred: Informal Opinion 20000219 (which Gary Green and Vance rely on), Bar Opinion 43 and State ex rel. McKittrick v. C.S. Dudley & Co. (1937) (which ACLU v. Miller relies on), Carey v. Gossom (1920) and Opinions 930079 and 20090040 are leads only. McFarland v. George (1958), In re Randolph (1961, cited by In re Agron) and other decisions under the Canons or the Code are deferred as decided under a superseded regime; Risjord v. Lewis (1999) is held but is not in this page’s research. This page describes these only as the quoting authority states them, attributed to it.
- The decisions are CourtListener copies, not the courts’ own. ACLU v. Miller is the combined opinion with two dissents (Blackmar, C.J., in a separate opinion); Eng carries a partial dissent (Riley, C.J., on the fraudulent-inducement claim). Holaday, Nationwide Transfer and In re Agron carry no reporter citation in our research and are cited by docket number and slip opinion. In re Agron’s stored text states two different payment amounts, so this page states none. In re Agron paraphrases Rule 4-7.2(c)(3) without the words “or other not-for-profit legal services organization”; this page quotes the rule, not the paraphrase. Grillo (2015) describes Rule 4-5.4(a)’s exceptions differently from the stored rule, which has five; (a)(5) is undated, and this page does not say when it was added. The rule pages and orders are courts.mo.gov captures of October 8, 2026 that cannot be refetched by script, so a later amendment would not show.
- Missouri informal opinions are ethics advisory opinions issued by the Office of Legal Ethics Counsel; the stored pages are written summaries of select informal opinions and say they are advisory and not binding. Opinions numbered before 2017, and 2015-05, print no date; their era is read from the rule numbering and the form of the number. This page presents each only as advice the office gave, not as a holding or a rule. Eng is a federal court’s reading of Missouri law. In Nationwide Transfer, the conclusion that the fee split was unenforceable under RSMo 484.150 is the circuit court’s; the Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the companies had no right to any portion of the legal fees.
- Later treatment of every Missouri authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held or advised, not that it remains good law.
Frequently asked questions
Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Missouri?
Yes, under Rule 4-1.5(e) of the Missouri Supreme Court Rules, if three conditions are met. A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation, the client agrees to the association and the agreement is confirmed in writing, and the total fee is reasonable. Informal Opinion 2018-05 (advisory) advised that a lawyer may not pay a referral fee to an out-of-state lawyer, not licensed in Missouri, who referred the case, because Rule 4-7.2(c) prohibits giving anything of value for recommending the lawyer’s services, and may divide the fee with that lawyer only if the division complies with Rule 4-1.5(e).
Is there a cap on referral fees in Missouri?
Rule 4-1.5(e) states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. It requires that the total fee be reasonable, that the division be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility for the representation, and that the client agree to the association, with the agreement confirmed in writing.
Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Missouri?
Yes. Rule 4-1.5(e)(2) requires, for every division between lawyers who are not in the same firm, that the client agree to the association and that the agreement be confirmed in writing. The rule’s words do not say who confirms the agreement in writing, and do not name the share each lawyer will receive. The decisions that required a written agreement with the client in which each lawyer assumes joint responsibility (Londoff v. Vuylsteke (1999); Eng v. Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho (8th Cir. 2010)) applied the rule as it read before July 1, 2007, not today’s words.
Can a Missouri lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?
Rule 4-1.5(e) governs a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Informal Opinion 2018-05 (advisory) advised that a Missouri lawyer may not pay a referral fee to an out-of-state lawyer, not licensed in Missouri, who referred the case, and may divide the contingent fee with that lawyer only if the division complies with Rule 4-1.5(e) — in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility; the client agrees to the association, confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable. Which state’s rules apply in discipline is set by Rule 4-8.5(b). In Eng (2010), a federal court of appeals applied Missouri’s pre-2007 Rule 4-1.5(e) to a Michigan firm’s referral agreement with a Missouri firm, without discussing Rule 4-8.5 or saying why Missouri’s rule governed. No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.
Sources
- Missouri Supreme Court Rules, Rule 4 (Rules 4-1.5, 4-5.4, 4-7.2, 4-8.5), courts.mo.gov rule pages captured October 8, 2026: Rule 4-1.5, Rule 4-5.4, Rule 4-7, Rules 4-8.1 to 4-9.1
- Revised Statutes of Missouri, fetched October 8, 2026: RSMo 484.150, RSMo 436.556
- Cases and informal ethics opinions: linked in the tables above.
More states: Referral fee rules by state.
Disclaimer
This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.