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Short answer. Indiana lets lawyers who are not in the same firm divide a fee only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and the total fee is reasonable (Rule 1.5(e) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct). The rule states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share.

Sources read October 9, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 28, 2026. Rules text is as printed on the Indiana Supreme Court’s rules pages (rules.incourts.gov), fetched October 9, 2026. The former words of Rule 7.3(e) are from the Indiana Supreme Court’s order of October 14, 2010 amending the Rules, read from an Internet Archive copy fetched October 9, 2026. The former statute is from the 2020 and 2021 editions of the Indiana Code on iga.in.gov, fetched October 9, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.

Indiana’s referral fee rules at a glance

Question Indiana’s answer Source
Governing rule Rule 1.5(e), Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct Ind. RPC 1.5(e)
Written client consent Required in every division: the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing Rule 1.5(e)(2); In re Wall (2017)
Notice to the client The client’s agreement covers the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive Rule 1.5(e)(2)
Proportion to services or joint responsibility Required: the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation Rule 1.5(e)(1)
Reasonable total fee Required Rule 1.5(e)(3)
Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share None stated in Rule 1.5(e) Rule 1.5(e)
Statutes Our search of the Indiana Code (Title 35, 2020, 2021 and 2026 editions; Title 33, 2026) found none on dividing fees between lawyers; IC 35-45-14-2 (unlawful solicitation) is a repealed statute Former IC 35-45-14-2

What Rule 1.5(e) says

Rule 1.5(e) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct governs the division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm (Ind. RPC 1.5(e)). Its opening words and paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) are in force since January 1, 2005; our research holds no start date for paragraph (e)(3). Its words:

(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:

(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;

(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and

(3) the total fee is reasonable.

The words in force before 2005 are not quoted here from the rule itself. As Hailey (2003) and Stochel (2003) quote them, the earlier (e)(1) allowed joint responsibility only “by written agreement with the client”, and the earlier client term required only that the client be advised of and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved. Decisions that applied that earlier wording did not construe today’s (e)(1) or (e)(2), or apply its share-in-writing term.

What the client must agree to in writing

Every division between lawyers who are not in the same firm needs the client’s agreement to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, confirmed in writing (Rule 1.5(e)(2), in force since January 1, 2005).

Two Supreme Court of Indiana decisions apply today’s words. In In re Wall (2017), the Court found a violation of Rule 1.5(e) where no argument was made that its requirements were met and at least one of them (that the client agree in writing to the share each lawyer will receive) indisputably was not met. In In re Eslinger (2009), approving a conditional agreement for discipline on stipulated facts, the Court accepted the parties’ agreement that the lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e) by failing to obtain the client’s consent to pay another attorney, not a member of his firm, for working on the client’s 2006 case. The order does not quote the rule, and the violation rests on the parties’ agreement.

Before 2005, as Hailey (2003) and Stochel (2003) quote the rule, the client term was that the client be advised of and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved, and a written agreement with the client was called for only on the joint-responsibility route ((e)(1): “by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility”). Applying that wording, the Court of Appeals held in Fitzpatrick (2009) that a fee-sharing agreement signed by the clients and all the attorneys met that (e)(2).

What must be disclosed to the client

Today’s client term includes the share: the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing (Rule 1.5(e)(2)). Disciplinary Commission Advisory Opinion 2-18 (December 2018, nonbinding) describes Rule 1.5(e), in its own paraphrase, as prohibiting sharing a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm without informing the client about how the fee is shared.

Under the pre-2005 wording the client had to be advised of and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved. Hailey (2003) found a violation where, with the rule’s other requirements also lacking, the clients were not aware of the other lawyer’s participation, and Stochel (2003), on agreed facts, where the client was neither advised of nor consented to the division. In re Philpot (2005), which does not quote the rule or date the conduct and is not shown to apply today’s (e)(2), approved an agreed finding of a Rule 1.5(e) violation where the lawyer, without consulting the client, hired another attorney and billed the client for that attorney’s work.

Separately, a lawyer who refers clients under a reciprocal referral agreement permitted by Rule 7.2(b)(4) must inform the client of the existence and nature of the agreement (Rule 7.2(b)(4)(ii)).

Proportionality or joint responsibility

Every division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm must meet all three conditions of Rule 1.5(e): the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation ((e)(1)); the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing ((e)(2)); and the total fee is reasonable ((e)(3)). Paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) are in force since January 1, 2005; (e)(3) carries no start date in our research.

In Kummerer v. Marshall (2012), the Court of Appeals, quoting today’s words, read (e)(1) as allowing two ways to divide a fee: by services performed, which must be reasonable under the Rule 1.5(a) factors and may be fixed by reasonably forecasting each lawyer’s work at the outset or by splitting the fee after the work to correspond to it; or with each lawyer assuming joint responsibility, “meaning each can be held liable in a malpractice suit.” The finding in that case that the equal-split forecast was reasonable is the trial court’s. In In re Wall (2017), the Supreme Court held that local counsel contracted to an out-of-state firm, treated as an independent contractor, keeping his own firm name and letterhead and paid small sums for discrete services, was not “in the same firm” with it, so Rule 1.5(e) applied.

Under the pre-2005 (e)(1), joint responsibility had to be assumed by written agreement with the client. Hailey (2003) and Stochel (2003, on agreed facts) found violations where the division was not proportional to the services performed and there was no such agreement. In In re Estate of Johnson (2006), the Court of Appeals held that two co-counsel assumed joint responsibility and upheld an equal division of the fee; in Fitzpatrick (2009), it found a rough proportionality of work where co-counsel divided two related suits between them. These decisions applied the earlier wording, not today’s (e)(1).

Enforcing a division between lawyers. These decisions applied the pre-2005 wording:

  • In Fitzpatrick (2009), the Court of Appeals held that neither Galanis nor Rule 1.5(e) limited a co-counsel to quantum meruit under a fee-sharing contract the clients and all the attorneys signed, and affirmed contract damages.
  • In Freeman v. Mayer (1996), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a federal court predicting Indiana law before Trotter v. Nelson (1997), gave as its best prediction that the Indiana Supreme Court would not permit a lawyer to invoke Rule 1.5(e) as a shield against a substantively unobjectionable agreement with an out-of-state lawyer, where the clients were advised of the arrangement and did not object and no one claimed the fee unreasonable.
  • In In re Marriage of Benjamin (2006), the Court of Appeals held that a lawyer who had assigned his cases to another firm may be entitled to have some fees credited to his account with it only to the extent provided by, and in compliance with, Rule 1.5(e), and remanded for the facts.

Referring a case out of Indiana, or into it

Indiana’s choice-of-law rule, Rule 8.5(b), says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Indiana exercises its disciplinary authority (Ind. RPC 8.5(b)), in force since January 1, 2005:

(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and

(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct.

Decisions applying Rule 8.5(b). Two Supreme Court of Indiana decisions apply it, and neither concerns a division of fees or a referral payment. In In re Rocchio (2011), the Court applied Indiana’s rules under Rule 8.5(b)(2) to a lawyer’s website statements about his Indiana license, because their predominant effect was in Indiana. In In re Westerfield (2016), it applied Florida’s rules to an Indiana-admitted lawyer’s solicitation and fee conduct in Florida, where she was not licensed.

Dividing a fee across a state line. Rule 1.5(e) governs a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Freeman v. Mayer (7th Cir. 1996) applied Indiana’s pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e) to an agreement between an Illinois lawyer and an Indiana lawyer without discussing Rule 8.5. Michigan’s ethics opinion RI-382 (2021) advises Michigan lawyers that they may enter into fee division relationships with out-of-state lawyers if the division complies with the ethical rules of both jurisdictions; it is a Michigan opinion, not an Indiana authority. Neither applies Indiana’s Rule 8.5(b).

No Indiana statute or ethics opinion applying Rule 8.5(b) was found (searched October 9, 2026). No Indiana authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.

Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers

  • Payment for referrals. “(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending or advertising the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may:” pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by Rule 7.2 ((b)(1)); pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service described in Rule 7.3(d) ((b)(2)); pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17 ((b)(3)); and refer clients to another lawyer or a non-lawyer professional pursuant to an agreement not otherwise prohibited under the Rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive and the client is informed of the existence and nature of the agreement ((b)(4)(i)–(ii)) (Rule 7.2(b), in force since January 1, 2011). ISBA Opinion 1 of 2012 (advisory) found that a group-coupon company’s keeping half of the fees collected is not limited to the reasonable costs of the advertisement under (b)(1); Disciplinary Commission Advisory Opinion 1-18 (April 2018, nonbinding) advised that an online service’s per-service marketing fee does not qualify as the reasonable cost of advertising either, and that a lawyer may not accept referrals from a for-profit referral service or pay a fee for a referral.
  • Compensation for recommending the lawyer. Rule 7.3(e), in force since January 1, 2011: “(e) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure the lawyer’s employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in the lawyer’s employment by a client, except that the lawyer may pay for public communication permitted by Rule 7.2 and the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service falling within the provisions of paragraph (d) above.” In In re Wray (2018), the Supreme Court found a 7.3(e) violation (improperly giving something of value for a recommendation for employment), in a discipline in which it found that a nonlawyer who solicited clients and was owed a second contingent fee from their recoveries acted as the lawyer’s agent. Before 2011 that prohibition was Rule 7.3(f). Rule 7.3(e) was then a different rule: a list of lawyer referral services from which a lawyer could accept referrals. Those former words were in force until December 31, 2010 and are not law today; they are not subparts of today’s Rule 7.3(e). Rule 7.3(d), which today’s 7.3(e) and 7.2(b)(2) name, is not in the research this page is drawn from.
  • Nonlawyers. “(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:” an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons ((a)(1)); a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17, pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed upon purchase price ((a)(2), in force since January 1, 2005); and a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement ((a)(3)) (Rule 5.4(a)). Our research holds these three exceptions and no fourth. Fitzpatrick (2009) reports that Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. 2007) disapproved statements in Trotter at 1153 allowing civil liability on the basis of the Rules. With that note, Trotter v. Nelson (1997), applying the Rules as in force in 1997, held a nonlawyer employee’s alleged five-percent share of fees on cases she referred a referral-fee agreement, unenforceable, and not an (a)(3) profit-sharing plan, which may not be tied to the receipt of a particular legal fee. In re Wray (2018) found a 5.4(a) violation where a nonlawyer acting as the lawyer’s agent solicited clients and was owed a second contingent fee from their recoveries. Advisory opinions apply 5.4(a) to a lawyer’s percentage of a broker’s recurring fee for referring clients (ISBA 3 of 2008: a violation), a coupon company keeping half the fee (ISBA 1 of 2012: likely a violation), an online service’s per-matter marketing fee (Disciplinary Commission 1-18: a risk of violation) and the “license rental” model (Disciplinary Commission 2-18: a risk of violation). None of these opinions is binding.
  • Statutes. IC 35-45-14-2 (Unlawful solicitation) is a repealed statute. The 2021 edition of the Indiana Code prints it as “Repealed by P.L.174-2021, SEC.78.”, and its chapter, IC 35-45-14, was repealed by P.L.9-2022. Its subdivisions, as the 2020 edition prints them, read “(1) knowingly or intentionally solicits, advises, requests, or induces another person to bring an action in a court; and” and “(2) in making a solicitation under subdivision (1), directly or indirectly receives any compensation, fee, or commission from the attorney for the solicitation;”. These are former law, not law in force. This page does not give the section’s opening words or penalty, or a date for either repeal.

Indiana cases

We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law. Only Eslinger (2009), Kummerer (2012) and Wall (2017) apply today’s Rule 1.5(e); the earlier Rule 1.5(e) decisions applied the pre-2005 wording, except Philpot (2005), which neither quotes nor dates the rule it applied. Trotter applied Rules 5.4(a) and 7.3(f) as in force before 2005, and Wills (1999) applied Rule 5.4(a) as then in force and recited claims under then-Rule 7.3(f); Wray (2018) applies the post-2011 letters. Freeman is a federal court’s prediction of Indiana law. Philpot and Eslinger approve agreed discipline on stipulated facts, and Stochel rests on agreed facts.

Case Citation Year What it held
Freeman v. Mayer 95 F.3d 569 1996 U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a diversity suit between an Illinois lawyer and an Indiana lawyer and his firm on a fifty-fifty fee-sharing letter agreement, applying Indiana law and the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e): assuming for argument that the division was not proportional and that there was no written agreement with the clients by which each lawyer assumed joint responsibility, and noting that the clients were advised of the arrangement and did not object and that no one claimed the fee unreasonable, it gave as its best prediction that the Indiana Supreme Court “would not permit one of its attorneys to invoke Rule 1.5(e) as a shield against living up to a substantively unobjectionable contractual arrangement with an out-of-state lawyer”, relying on the Rules’ Scope statement that they are not designed to be a basis for civil liability, and affirmed the judgment enforcing the agreement. It is a federal court’s prediction of Indiana law, decided before Trotter v. Nelson (1997).
Trotter v. Nelson 684 N.E.2d 1150 1997 Fitzpatrick (2009) reports that Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. 2007) disapproved statements in Trotter at 1153 allowing civil liability on the basis of the Rules; Liggett is not in our research. Supreme Court of Indiana, on transfer, in a nonlawyer employee’s suit on an alleged agreement under which the lawyer would pay her five percent of the attorney’s fees realized on personal injury cases directed by or through her: it held that Rules 5.4(a) and 7.3(f) are explicit judicial declarations of Indiana public policy and that agreements in violation of them are unenforceable; that any agreement between an attorney and a layman for the payment of referral fees not otherwise authorized by the Rules is unenforceable in Indiana, and the alleged agreement violated Rule 7.3(f); and that it was not a profit-sharing plan permitted by Rule 5.4(a)(3), because a profit-sharing plan with a nonlawyer may not be tied to the receipt of a particular legal fee. It applied the Rules as in force in 1997; its 7.3(f) is the pre-2011 letter of the prohibition now in 7.3(e).
Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Wills 717 N.E.2d 151 1999 Supreme Court of Indiana, on a motion to disqualify an insurer’s employed house counsel from defending its insured: attorneys employed by insurance companies may represent insureds under circumstances and to the extent permitted by their ethical obligations, and their employment does not necessarily constitute the unauthorized practice of law by the insurer. It treated the movants’ contentions under Rules 1.8(f), 7.3(f), 5.4(a) and 5.4(d) as relating to the inherent inappropriateness of the arrangement and noted that none of their evidence was specific to the lawyer’s relationship with the insurer. It does not construe the words of 5.4(a); it applied the Rules as in force in 1999.
In re Hailey 792 N.E.2d 851 2003 Supreme Court of Indiana, in a discipline, applying the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e), which it quotes: it found all three requirements lacking where the lawyer paid an Alabama attorney one-third of his fee ($533,333.33 of $1.6 million) for minimal involvement (a few telephone conversations), the clients were not aware of the Alabama attorney’s participation, and there was no evidence of a joint responsibility agreement, and concluded that the fee sharing violated Rule 1.5(e). With violations of Rules 1.5(a), 1.5(c), 1.3 and 1.15(b), it imposed a public reprimand.
In re Stochel 792 N.E.2d 874 2003 Supreme Court of Indiana, on the parties’ agreed facts in a discipline, quoting the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e): the lawyer violated it where he paid the referring attorney $16,000 of his contingent fee, the payment was neither proportional to the services performed by each attorney nor pursuant to a written agreement with the client under which each attorney assumed joint responsibility, the client was neither advised of nor consented to the division of the fee, and the referring attorney’s only contact was an initial consultation. With violations of Rules 1.5(a)-(c), it accepted the agreed public reprimand.
In re Philpot 820 N.E.2d 141 2005 Supreme Court of Indiana, approving a conditional agreement for discipline on stipulated facts that the lawyer, without consulting the client, hired another attorney to research an issue in a dissolution case and billed the client for that attorney’s research time and letter: it approved the agreed finding that the conduct violated Rule 1.5(e), which it describes as prohibiting division of fees between lawyers not in the same firm without the consent of the client (with Rules 7.1(b) and 8.4(d)); public reprimand. The order does not quote the rule or date the conduct; the proceeding was docketed in 2004, so it is not shown to apply today’s (e)(2).
In re Marriage of Benjamin 849 N.E.2d 719 2006 Court of Appeals of Indiana, on garnishment of fees a lawyer had assigned with his cases to another firm in 2001: quoting the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e), and Hailey (2003) for the rule that fee sharing between attorneys not in the same firm is permissible only if they comply fully with it, it held that the record lacked the facts needed to decide whether any sharing with the assigning lawyer was permissible and remanded for evidentiary hearings, and held the receiving firm entitled to all fees collected on the assigned cases, with the limitation that the assigning lawyer may be entitled to have some fees credited to his outstanding account with the firm, but only to the extent provided by, and in compliance with, Rule 1.5(e). Reversed and remanded.
In re Estate of Johnson 855 N.E.2d 686 2006 Court of Appeals of Indiana, in a fee dispute between co-counsel over a 1996 wrongful-death contingent fee, applying the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e), which it quotes: it held that the two lawyers assumed joint responsibility for the claim (on the 1996 retainer agreement with the client, their oral agreement to split the fee equally, and the federal court’s conclusion that the withdrawing lawyer fulfilled his obligations), found no evidence that the client objected and no dispute that the 40% total fee was reasonable, and concluded that the trial court did not violate Rule 1.5(e) by ordering an equal division (20% of the judgment, half the contingent fee) although one lawyer withdrew after the judgment.
In re Eslinger 907 N.E.2d 527 2009 Supreme Court of Indiana, approving a conditional agreement for discipline on stipulated facts that, without the client’s knowledge, part of the work on the client’s 2006 case was done by an attorney not in the lawyer’s firm for $75 an hour: it accepted the parties’ agreement that the lawyer violated Rule 1.5(e) by failing to obtain the client’s consent to pay another attorney, not a member of his firm, for working on the case (with Rule 1.5(a), for a 50% contingent fee on top of an hourly fee and for billing that attorney’s time at $225 an hour); public reprimand. The conduct (2006) falls under today’s words, which the order does not quote; the violation rests on the parties’ agreement.
Fitzpatrick v. Kenneth J. Allen & Associates, P.C. 913 N.E.2d 255 2009 Court of Appeals of Indiana, in a fee suit between co-counsel on a 2001 written fee-sharing agreement signed by the clients and all three attorneys (half of the fee to each side; total fee 33 1/3%), applying the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e), which it quotes: the signed agreement met (e)(2); the lawyers’ division of the two related suits between them created a rough proportionality of work and the total fee was not alleged unreasonable, so that enforcing the contract did not contradict the spirit of (e)(1) or (3); and neither Galanis nor Rule 1.5(e) limited the lawyer to quantum meruit. It affirmed contract damages, reversing only to subtract a sum paid to another lawyer. It relied on Liggett v. Young (Ind. 2007) that the Rules have limited application outside the disciplinary process.
In re Rocchio 943 N.E.2d 797 2011 Supreme Court of Indiana, in a discipline of a lawyer licensed in Indiana and Michigan: Indiana law applies under Rule 8.5(b)(2) to the count on his website statements, because, while the alleged website violations have no specific geographical location, his representations about his Indiana law license have their predominant effect in Indiana, which has a greater interest than any other jurisdiction in an attorney’s misrepresentations about his or her authority to practice in the state. It does not concern a fee division or a referral payment.
Kummerer v. Marshall 971 N.E.2d 198 2012 Court of Appeals of Indiana, in a fee suit between lawyers on a 2007 agreement to split equally the fee on a transferred contingency case, quoting today’s Rule 1.5(e): it read the rule as allowing two ways to divide a fee between lawyers not in the same firm, by services performed, or with each lawyer assuming joint responsibility, meaning each can be held liable in a malpractice suit; a division by services must be reasonable under the Rule 1.5(a) factors and may be made by reasonably forecasting each lawyer’s work at the outset or by splitting the fee after the work to correspond to it. Because the trial court had to judge whether the equal-split forecast was reasonable, it affirmed the denial of prejudgment interest. The finding that the forecast was reasonable is the trial court’s.
In re Westerfield 64 N.E.3d 218 2016 Supreme Court of Indiana, disciplining an Indiana-admitted lawyer for conduct in Florida, where she was not licensed: under Rule 8.5(b), it applied Florida’s Rules and found violations of Florida Rules 4-7.18(a)(1) (soliciting employment, directly or through an agent, from persons with no prior relationship for pecuniary gain, here through a nonlawyer marketing representative who signed homeowners up for her), 4-1.5(a) (charging a fee generated by employment obtained through prohibited solicitation), 4-1.16(d), 4-5.5(a) and 4-5.5(b)(1); suspension of at least eighteen months without automatic reinstatement. It did not rule on a fee division.
In re Wall 73 N.E.3d 170 2017 Supreme Court of Indiana, in a discipline of local counsel contracted to a Florida firm, reviewing de novo and rejecting the hearing officer’s view that Rule 1.5(e) did not apply: on the totality of the evidence (agreements limiting local counsel to local tasks, an “associate” agreement treating him as an independent contractor, small sums paid for discrete services, his own firm name and letterhead) he and the Florida firm were not “in the same firm”, and he violated Rule 1.5(e), no argument being made that its requirements were met and at least one (that the client agree in writing to the share each lawyer will receive) indisputably not met. With Rules 5.5(a), 8.4(a) and 1.5(a), it suspended him for 30 days. It applied today’s wording.
In re Wray 91 N.E.3d 578 2018 Supreme Court of Indiana, in a discipline: it found by clear and convincing evidence that a nonlawyer who cold-called owners of allegedly defective homes, signed them to agreements the lawyer drafted or approved, and was owed a second contingent fee from their recoveries acted as the lawyer’s agent, held that this was not merely a referral system, and found violations of Rules 5.4(a) (improperly sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer), 7.3(a), 7.3(e) (improperly giving something of value for a recommendation for employment) and 7.3(f), with 1.4, 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 5.3, 8.1(a) and 8.4; suspension of at least nine months without automatic reinstatement. It names the rules by their post-2011 letters, does not quote 5.4(a) or 7.3(e), and does not set out which facts made out those two violations apart from the agency finding.

Indiana ethics opinions

These opinions are advisory. The Indiana State Bar Association (ISBA) Legal Ethics Committee’s Opinion 3 of 2008 says it does not carry the weight of law, and the Disciplinary Commission’s Opinions 1-18 and 2-18 say they are nonbinding and not attributable to the Supreme Court. A risk or danger an opinion names is not a finding of a violation. Our research holds only a year for the ISBA opinions and a month for Opinions 1-18 and 2-18. The ISBA opinions from 1991, 1992 and 2001 applied the Rules as then in force, not today’s Rule 5.4(a)(2) or 7.3(e). As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched.

Opinion Date What it said
ISBA Opinion 9 of 1991 1991 A lawyer who took a personal-injury referral, under a client contract making both lawyers jointly responsible, may not divide fees with the referring lawyer, who was disbarred before the settlement, but ethically may pay him on a quantum meruit basis for services provided before disbarment, in accordance with Rule 1.5’s reasonableness requirements; such a payment would not violate Rule 5.4(a) or Rule 5.5(b) because the lawyer would not be dividing a fee with him. The committee took no position on the legal question of his entitlement. It applied the pre-2005 Rules 1.5(e) and 5.4(a).
ISBA Opinion 7 of 1991 1991 A research company may bill its sister companies three times the hourly salaried rate of its salaried in-house counsel, plus expenses and a nominal handling fee, for his legal work, provided confidentiality and conflict-of-interest concerns are addressed and he exercises independent professional judgment; because the rationale of the bar on fee splitting with a nonlawyer is the concern of control by an unregulated lay person interested in profit rather than the client’s interests, that rationale would not be served by concluding the conduct impermissible, and it is not the unauthorized practice of law. It applied the pre-2005 Rule 5.4(a).
ISBA Opinion 2 of 1991 1991 An Indiana lawyer may not participate in a for-profit “Personal Injury Hotline” that refers accident callers to participating lawyers, presumably for payment, without violating Rules 7.2 and 7.3: the hotline fails every category of referral service the 1991 Rule 7.3(e) permitted, so a lawyer is likely prohibited from accepting its referrals, and under the 1991 Rule 7.3(f) a lawyer may not compensate it or give it anything of value; it also found the hotline likely misleading under Rule 7.1. It applied the 1991 Rule 7.3(e) (the former list of lawyer referral services) and 7.3(f) (the predecessor of today’s 7.3(e)), not today’s 7.3(e) words.
ISBA Unpublished Opinion U1 of 1991 1991 On a law firm’s plan to provide legal services at specified fees to a credit union’s members, promoted by the credit union: Rule 7.3, especially 7.3(e)(4), must be implemented as it relates to the credit union; drawing on ABA Formal Opinion 87-355, it concluded that the plan would seem to be available to the credit union and that, although limiting referral to a single firm exposes it to potential conflicts, no authority seems specifically to prohibit it. It applied the 1991 Rule 7.3(e)(4), a former rule that is not law today.
ISBA Unpublished Opinion U2 of 1991 1991 A lawyer joining the IBN Business Network, a business networking group, would not violate Rule 7.3, because the group is not a lawyer referral service under the 1991 Rule 7.3(e); it reminded the lawyer of Rule 7.3(a) and (b) on in-person solicitation. It applied the pre-2011 lawyer-referral-service paragraph, not today’s 7.3(e) words.
ISBA Opinion 4 of 1992 1992 A lawyer who advises clients referred by a financial organization’s living-trust seminars, under a fee arrangement made directly with and billed separately to each client, does not appear to violate Rule 5.4 or 5.5 if he independently assesses each client’s legal needs, answers all legal questions and prepares, reviews and files all documents, though the potential for a violation is great; if the agreement were exclusive between the organization and the lawyer, it may well be considered a referral service in violation of Rule 7.3, and the lawyer must comply with Rule 7.3(f) (no compensation for recommending his employment). It applied the Rules as in force in 1992: its referral-service concern is the then-7.3(e) list, and its 7.3(f) is the predecessor of today’s 7.3(e).
ISBA Opinion 1 for 2001 2001 A lawyer who part-owns a financial planning firm whose nonlawyer staff recommend him to its customers for estate-planning work violates Rule 7.3(a) (in-person recommendation, or assisting another in it); the prospect that the firm’s employees or nonlawyer owners will be rewarded, even indirectly, for referring clients creates the potential for violation of Rule 7.3(f); and the arrangement presents serious risk of conflict with Rules 5.4(a)-(c) and 5.5(b). On Rule 5.4(a) it found a danger, depending on the details of the firm’s structure and operations, of a violation, not a violation. It applied the Rules as in force in 2001 (its 7.3(f) is the predecessor of today’s 7.3(e)).
ISBA Opinion 3 of 2008 2008 A lawyer cannot receive compensation through a percentage share of a recurring fee a brokerage firm or financial advisor charges clients the lawyer refers to it. The committee concluded that this violates Rules 1.1, 2.1, 1.6, 1.8 and 5.4 and is impermissible even with the client’s fully informed consent, resting chiefly on the conflict rules and adding that Rule 5.4 prohibits a lawyer from sharing fees with a nonlawyer subject to a few exceptions not applicable. In its own words, it does not carry the weight of law.
ISBA Opinion 1 of 2012 2012 On group-coupon marketing in which the coupon company keeps half of the fees collected: such an arrangement violates Rule 7.2(b)(1), because the fee kept is not limited to the reasonable costs of the advertisement, and a lawyer working with an advertising program in which the lawyer shares fees for channeling professional work likely violates Rules 5.4 and 7.2, which prohibit fee sharing and only permit an attorney to pay the reasonable costs for the marketing (with concerns under Rules 1.15, 1.16, 1.18, 2.1 and Guideline 9.3). It suggested that a coupon at a nominal fee in line with the reasonable costs of the marketing, with the client paying the lawyer directly, would not violate the Rules (n.4). It applied today’s 7.2(b)(1).
Disciplinary Commission Advisory Opinion 1-18 April 2018 Nonbinding, and not attributable to the Supreme Court. A lawyer who participates in an online legal referral service that charges a “marketing fee” every time the lawyer earns a fee risks violating Rule 5.4(a); the marketing fee does not qualify as the reasonable cost of advertising, because it is tied to the cost of the legal services rather than the actual cost of advertising and is paid only after the lawyer renders a service, and is more akin to fee splitting or a referral fee; a lawyer may not accept referrals from a for-profit referral service or pay a fee for a referral. It also raises Rules 5.4(c), 1.2(c) and 7.1. It states risks, not findings.
Disciplinary Commission Advisory Opinion 2-18 December 2018 Nonbinding. Under the “license rental” model, in which a nonlawyer company or out-of-state law firm directs Indiana cases to an Indiana lawyer for a portion of the fees, a lawyer paid only a portion of the larger fee collected by the nonlawyer company risks violating Rule 5.4(a), and Rule 1.5(e) prohibits sharing a fee between lawyers not in the same firm without informing the client about how the fee is shared, which under that model is often kept secret from the client. Its 1.5(e) sentence is the Commission’s paraphrase, not the rule’s words. It also raises Rules 5.5(a), 1.8(f), 5.4(c), 1.4, 1.2(c), 5.3(b) and 8.4(a). It states risks, not findings.

What our research did not find

  • Rule 1.5(e)(3), Rule 5.4(a) and its exceptions (a)(1) and (a)(3) carry no start date in our research, so this page gives none. The dates it gives are January 1, 2005 for Rule 1.5(e), (e)(1) and (e)(2), Rule 5.4(a)(2) and Rule 8.5(b), and January 1, 2011 for Rule 7.2(b) and Rule 7.3(e).
  • IC 35-45-14-2 (Unlawful solicitation) is a repealed statute: the 2021 edition of the Indiana Code prints it as “Repealed by P.L.174-2021, SEC.78.”, and the chapter IC 35-45-14 was repealed by P.L.9-2022. Its subdivisions (1) and (2), quoted above from the 2020 edition, are former law. Neither repealing act is held, so this page gives no effective date for either repeal. The section’s opening words, its penalty and any later subdivisions are not in our research, and this page does not supply them.
  • Before 2011, Rule 7.3(e) was a list of lawyer referral services from which a lawyer could accept referrals. Its struck subparts (7.3(e)(1)–(4) and their lettered clauses) were in force until December 31, 2010 and are not law today; they are not subparts of today’s Rule 7.3(e), whose words are a different rule (the former Rule 7.3(f) prohibition). The pre-2011 opening words that introduced the list are not in our research, and only former 7.3(e)(4) carries a start date (January 1, 2005). Our research stores the former clauses lettered (a)–(d) where the 1991 ISBA opinions print (A)–(D), and former 7.3(e)(3) cites “Rule 7.3(e)(1)(D)”.
  • Rule 7.3(d) (today’s list of permitted lawyer referral services, named by Rules 7.2(b)(2) and 7.3(e)), the rest of Rule 7.3, Rule 1.17 (named by Rules 5.4(a)(2) and 7.2(b)(3)), and the Comments to Rules 1.5, 5.4, 7.2 and 8.5 are not in the research this page is drawn from, and this page does not state their terms.
  • The Rule 1.5(e) words in force until December 31, 2004 are held in our research but are not in the research this page is drawn from, and the pre-2005 Rule 5.4(a)(2) words are not loaded. Where this page describes the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e), it uses only the words that Hailey, Stochel, Freeman and Fitzpatrick quote.
  • Freeman (1996), Hailey and Stochel (2003), Marriage of Benjamin and Estate of Johnson (2006) and Fitzpatrick (2009) applied the pre-2005 Rule 1.5(e), whose (e)(1) required joint responsibility “by written agreement with the client” and whose (e)(2) required only that the client be advised of and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; Philpot (2005) neither quotes nor dates the rule it applied. Only Eslinger (2009, 2006 conduct), Kummerer (2012) and Wall (2017) apply today’s Rule 1.5(e). This page does not present the earlier decisions as construing today’s (e)(1) or (e)(2), or the share-in-writing term as one they applied. Kummerer’s quotation of the rule reads “the client agrees to the agreement” where the rule reads “agrees to the arrangement”; this page quotes the rule.
  • Trotter (1997) and ISBA Opinions 2 of 1991, 4 of 1992 and 1 for 2001 applied then-Rule 7.3(f), the predecessor of today’s 7.3(e), and Wills (1999) recited claims under it. ISBA Opinions 2 of 1991, U1 and U2 of 1991 and 4 of 1992 applied then-Rule 7.3(e), the former referral-service list; U1 applied the 1991 Rule 7.3(e)(4), not the 2005–2010 words our research holds. ISBA Opinions 9 and 7 of 1991, 4 of 1992 and 1 for 2001, Trotter and Wills applied Rule 5.4(a) before 2005; the 1991 opinions quote a Rule 5.4(a)(2) (completing a deceased lawyer’s unfinished business) that is not today’s (a)(2). This page does not present any of them as construing today’s Rule 7.3(e) or 5.4(a)(2). Wray (2018), Disciplinary Commission Opinion 1-18 and ISBA Opinion 1 of 2012 apply the post-2011 letters.
  • Kelly v. Smith (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), on fees from winding up a dissolved partnership, was vacated on transfer by Kelly v. Smith, 611 N.E.2d 118 (Ind. 1993), which did not reach Rule 1.5(e). It is not Indiana law, and this page does not cite it as such.
  • On Trotter (1997): Fitzpatrick (2009) reports that Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178, 183 (Ind. 2007) disapproved statements in Trotter at 1153 allowing civil liability on the basis of the Rules. Liggett and Csicsko v. Hill (2004) are not in our research. This page states Trotter’s holding only with that note.
  • Freeman is a federal court’s prediction of Indiana law, decided before Trotter. Kelly, Marriage of Benjamin, Estate of Johnson, Fitzpatrick and Kummerer are Court of Appeals decisions. Philpot and Eslinger approve agreed discipline on stipulated facts, and Stochel rests on agreed facts; this page does not present those agreed findings as contested holdings. In Kummerer, the finding that the equal split was a reasonable forecast is the trial court’s.
  • The ISBA Legal Ethics Committee opinions (2, 7, 9, U1 and U2 of 1991; 4 of 1992; 1 for 2001; 3 of 2008; 1 of 2012) and Disciplinary Commission Opinions 1-18 and 2-18 are advisory; 1-18 and 2-18 say they are nonbinding and not attributable to the Supreme Court, and 3 of 2008 says it does not carry the weight of law. RI-382 is a Michigan opinion. Opinions 1-18 and 2-18 state risks, 1 of 2012 a likely violation of Rules 5.4 and 7.2, and 1 for 2001 a danger of a Rule 5.4(a) violation; this page does not present any of them as binding, or a stated risk or danger as a finding of violation. U1 and U2 are unpublished, and U1 carries no number in our research.
  • The ISBA 1991, 1992 and 2001 opinions are held as scanned text that misreads many words; ISBA Opinion 9 of 1991 cites “Rule 1.5(c)” in its last sentence where its subject is Rule 1.5(e). Hailey’s footnote 2 letter is not reproduced; Wills is held as the Court’s opinion only (the dissent is not loaded); Philpot, Eslinger, Estate of Johnson and Fitzpatrick carry scanning slips; Rocchio and Wray are held without reporter page numbers. The ISBA opinions carry only a year, and Opinions 1-18 and 2-18 a month, and this page gives only those dates.
  • Our search (October 9, 2026) found no Indiana statute on dividing fees between lawyers, on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, or on choice of law for lawyer discipline, and no ethics opinion applying Rule 8.5(b). ISBA opinions from 2009 to 2020 were not screened (no index is held, and inbar.org refused scripted fetches); ISBA Opinion 6 of 1994 (fee sharing with non-lawyers) could not be obtained; index entries including 5 of 1984 (fee division), 3 of 1985 (lawyer referral services) and 3 of 1996 (voicemail referral) were not saved; and the 1987 adoption order and the 2009, 2016 and 2017 professional-conduct orders are not held. This page says only what these searches found, not that no such statute, opinion or decision exists.
  • Cited leads, among them In re Frey (1985), In re Jackson (2015), In re Skozen (1996), Matter of Anonymous (1994) and Matter of Thrasher (1996), are held as leads only and were not read. Benkie (2008), Allen (2002) and EEOC v. SVT (2014) are held in our research on Rules 7.2(b) and 7.3 but are not in the research this page is drawn from. The authorities on this page are not the only Indiana authorities on the topic.
  • Later treatment of every authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held, not that it remains good law.

Frequently asked questions

Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Indiana?

Yes, under Rule 1.5(e) of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, if three conditions are met. A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation, the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing, and the total fee is reasonable.

Is there a cap on referral fees in Indiana?

Rule 1.5(e) states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. It requires that the total fee be reasonable, that the division be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or that each lawyer assume joint responsibility for the representation, and that the client agree to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, with the agreement confirmed in writing.

Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Indiana?

Yes. Rule 1.5(e)(2) requires, for every division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm, that the client agree to the arrangement, including the share each lawyer will receive, and that the agreement be confirmed in writing. In In re Wall (2017), the Supreme Court of Indiana found a violation of Rule 1.5(e) where no argument was made that its requirements were met and at least one of them, that the client agree in writing to the share each lawyer will receive, indisputably was not met. Before 2005 the rule’s words differed, and decisions applying that earlier wording did not apply the share-in-writing term.

Can an Indiana lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?

Rule 1.5(e) governs a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. In In re Wall (2017), the Supreme Court of Indiana held, on the totality of the evidence, that Indiana local counsel contracted to a Florida firm (agreements limiting him to local tasks, an associate agreement treating him as an independent contractor, small sums paid for discrete services, his own firm name and letterhead) was not in the same firm with it, and found that he violated Rule 1.5(e), no argument being made that its requirements were met. Which state’s rules apply in discipline is set by Rule 8.5(b); no Indiana authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.

Sources

  • Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Indiana Supreme Court rules pages, fetched October 9, 2026: Rule 1.5, Rule 5.4, Rule 7.2, Rule 7.3, Rule 8.5
  • Former Rule 7.3(e) (in force until December 31, 2010), Order Amending Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct, Cause No. 94S00-1003-MS-128 (filed October 14, 2010), pp. 11-12, Internet Archive copy fetched October 9, 2026: in.gov
  • Former IC 35-45-14-2, Indiana Code, fetched October 9, 2026: 2021 edition, Title 35 (repeal line); 2020 edition, Title 35 (subdivisions (1) and (2))
  • Cases and ethics opinions: linked in the tables above.

More states: Referral fee rules by state.

Disclaimer

This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.