Short answer. Georgia lets lawyers in different firms divide a fee only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and the total fee is reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)). The rule states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share.
Sources read October 3–4, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 27, 2026. Rules text is as printed in the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (State Bar Rule 4-102) in the State Bar of Georgia Handbook, fetched October 4, 2026. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53 is read from an unofficial Justia copy fetched October 3, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.
Georgia’s referral fee rules at a glance
| Question | Georgia’s answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Governing rule | Rule 1.5(e), Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (State Bar Rule 4-102) | State Bar of Georgia Handbook, Rule 1.5(e) |
| Written client consent | Required only for a division by joint responsibility, not for one in proportion to services | Rule 1.5(e)(1) |
| Notice to the client | The client must be advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved | Rule 1.5(e)(2) |
| Proportion to services or joint responsibility | Required: in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation | Rule 1.5(e)(1) |
| Reasonable total fee | Required | Rule 1.5(e)(3) |
| Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share | None stated in Rule 1.5(e) | Rule 1.5(e) |
| Statutes | No Georgia statute on dividing fees between lawyers was found; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53, which its caption says is effective until January 1, 2027, makes acting as or paying a capper, runner or steerer unlawful | O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53 |
What Rule 1.5(e) says
Rule 1.5(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct governs the division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Its words, as printed in the State Bar of Georgia Handbook fetched October 4, 2026 (Bar Rule 4-102, Rule 1.5(e)), with the subsection labels added in brackets:
[(e)] A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
[(1)] the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
[(2)] the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and
[(3)] the total fee is reasonable.
The date these words took effect is not established in our sources. The Supreme Court of Georgia’s order of November 3, 2011 approved Rule 1.5 as a whole with these words, but does not show when they first took effect. They are stated here as printed when fetched in October 2026.
What the client must agree to in writing
A writing is needed in only one case. A division in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer needs no writing and no client consent under the rule’s words. A division on any other basis is allowed only where, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation (Rule 1.5(e)(1)). In every division, the client must be advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved (Rule 1.5(e)(2)), and the total fee must be reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)(3)).
Formal Advisory Opinion 05-9 (2006) advised that a fee division with a temporary lawyer directly supervised by a lawyer in the firm needs no client consent regarding the fee, though seeking consent is the prudent course where the temporary lawyer’s assistance will be a material component of the representation.
What must be disclosed to the client
For every division between lawyers not in the same firm, the client must be advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and must not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved (Rule 1.5(e)(2)).
In Eichholz Law Firm, P.C. v. Tate Law Group, LLC, 310 Ga. App. 848 (2011), the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the rule’s clear intent is to prohibit sharing a legal fee with a lawyer against the will of the client, so fee-splitting provisions between two firms could not be enforced to let a firm collect a share of a contingent fee where the clients discharged it before the contingency occurred. The discharged firm may seek recovery in quantum meruit for services it provided to the other firm. The court said it did not hold that fee-splitting agreements between lawyers generally are unenforceable.
Proportionality or joint responsibility
The division must be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer must assume joint responsibility for the representation (Rule 1.5(e)(1)), and the total fee must be reasonable (Rule 1.5(e)(3)).
Following Nickerson v. Holloway (1996), decided under the former Directory Rule, the Georgia Court of Appeals has said the rule’s purpose is to protect clients from referral fees that could unfairly inflate their bills by letting lawyers collect for little or no work, a purpose not implicated where both lawyers did some work and the fee is not inflated. On that basis, lawyers who jointly represent a client with no agreement on dividing the fee share equally (Kilgore v. Sheetz, 2004), and the rule did not apply to a lawyer who did substantial work on the matter (American Computer Technology, Inc. v. Hardwick, 2005). In Coleman v. Phillips (2023), the court stated it expressed no opinion on whether Rule 1.5(e) applied.
Formal Advisory Opinion 05-13 (2007) advised that fees between a firm and a lawyer or firm it associates as special counsel must be divided in accordance with Rule 1.5.
Referring a case out of Georgia, or into it
Georgia’s choice-of-law rule is Rule 8.5(b). It says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Georgia exercises its disciplinary authority (Bar Rule 4-102, Rule 8.5(b)), with the subsection labels added in brackets:
[(b)] Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
[(1)] for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
[(2)] for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer or Domestic or Foreign Lawyer’s conduct will occur.
The date these words took effect is not established in our sources.
Referring a case out of Georgia, or receiving one. Rule 1.5(e) speaks of any division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral.
Our research found no Georgia court decision, Formal Advisory Opinion or statute applying Rule 8.5(b) (searched October 3, 2026).
Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers
- Payment for referrals. “A lawyer shall not compensate, give or promise anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may:” pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by the rule (Rule 7.2(b)(1)); pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a lawyer referral service, if the service does not engage in conduct that would violate the Rules if engaged in by a lawyer (7.2(b)(2)); pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a bar-operated nonprofit referral service, including a fee calculated as a percentage of the legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom it referred a matter, provided the service is operated in the public interest to refer prospective clients to lawyers, pro bono and public service legal programs, and government, consumer or other agencies who can provide the assistance the clients need, and files annually with the Office of the General Counsel a report showing its rules and regulations, subscription charges, agreements with counsel, the number of participating lawyers and their names and addresses (7.2(b)(3)(i)); its sponsoring bar association is open to all lawyers licensed and eligible to practice in Georgia who maintain an office within the area served and meet reasonable objectively determinable experience requirements set by the bar association (7.2(b)(3)(ii)); the combined fees charged by the lawyer and the service to a referred client shall not exceed the total the client would have paid had no service been involved (7.2(b)(3)(iii)); and each member lawyer maintains errors and omissions insurance of no less than $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 in the aggregate (7.2(b)(3)(iv)); pay the usual and reasonable fees to a qualified legal services plan or an insurer providing legal services insurance as authorized by law to promote the lawyer’s, or the lawyer’s partner’s or associate’s, services, so long as the organization’s communications are not false, fraudulent, deceptive or misleading (7.2(b)(4)); pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17 (7.2(b)(5)); refer clients to another lawyer or a nonlawyer professional under an agreement not otherwise prohibited by the Rules that provides for the other person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer, if the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive and the client is informed of the existence and nature of the agreement (7.2(b)(6)(i)–(ii)); and give nominal gifts as an expression of appreciation that are neither intended nor reasonably expected to be a form of compensation for recommending a lawyer’s services (7.2(b)(7)).
- Nonlawyers. “A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:” an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner or associate may provide for payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons; a lawyer or firm purchasing the practice of a deceased, disabled or disappeared lawyer may, under Rule 1.17, pay the agreed-upon purchase price to that lawyer’s estate or other representative; nonlawyer employees may be included in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; a lawyer may share court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter; a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished business of a deceased lawyer may pay the estate that proportion of the total compensation which fairly represents the services the deceased lawyer rendered; and a lawyer may pay a referral fee to a bar-operated nonprofit lawyer referral service where the fee is calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service has referred a matter pursuant to Rule 7.3 (Rule 5.4(a)(1)–(6)). Formal Advisory Opinion 05-9 (2006) advised that, because a placement agency providing a temporary lawyer is not authorized to practice law, sharing fees with it would violate Rule 5.4(a); the agency may be compensated, but not by a portion of client fees.
- Statutes. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53, which its caption says is effective until January 1, 2027, when it is repealed and reserved (Ga. L. 2026, p. 879), makes it unlawful for any person, individually or as a public or private employee, or any firm, corporation, partnership or association, to act as a capper, runner or steerer for any practitioner (which includes an attorney) or health care service provider; the paragraph “shall not prohibit an attorney or health care provider from making a referral and receiving compensation as is permitted under applicable professional rules of conduct” (§ 33-24-53(c)(1)). It is also unlawful for a practitioner to compensate or give anything of value to a person acting as a capper, runner or steerer, and for a capper, runner or steerer to recommend or secure a practitioner’s employment if the practitioner obtains or intends to obtain benefits under a contract of insurance or asserts a claim against an insured or an insurer for providing services to the client (§ 33-24-53(c)(2)). A capper, runner or steerer is a person who receives a pecuniary benefit from a practitioner, directly or indirectly, to solicit, procure or attempt to procure a client at the direction or request of, or in cooperation with, a practitioner whose purpose is to obtain benefits under a contract of insurance or to assert a claim against an insured or an insurer for providing services to the client; it does not include an insurance company or its agent or employee referring its insureds, or a practitioner who procures clients through public media or by referrals or recommendations from other practitioners (§ 33-24-53(a)(1)). Except as provided in O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(5), it is unlawful for any person, including an attorney, to solicit, release or sell information relating to the parties of a motor vehicle collision for personal financial gain; this does not apply to mass public media advertisement and solicitation (§ 33-24-53(b)). A natural person convicted of a first offense is guilty of a misdemeanor punished by imprisonment of not less than 30 days and a fine not to exceed $1,000.00; a second or subsequent offense is a felony punished by imprisonment of not more than ten years and a fine of not more than $100,000.00 per violation (§ 33-24-53(d)). No authority we hold reads the (c)(1) carve-out, and this page does not say which payments it permits or what, if anything, replaces the section.
Georgia cases
We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law. Kilgore and Hardwick quote today’s Rule 1.5(e) but rest on Nickerson v. Holloway (1996), which construed the former Directory Rule 2-107(A); this page does not present Nickerson as construing today’s rule.
| Case | Citation | Year | What it held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kilgore v. Sheetz | 268 Ga. App. 761, 603 S.E.2d 24 | 2004 | Georgia Court of Appeals, in a fee dispute between a lawyer and the estate of his deceased co-counsel, who had no agreement on dividing the fees: quoting Rule 1.5(e), the court applied Nickerson v. Holloway (1996), which had rejected the argument that the proportionality requirement of the former Directory Rule (rendered in Kilgore as “[1.5 (e) (1)]”) overruled Georgia’s rule that lawyers jointly undertaking to represent a client without a contract as to the division of fees share equally, and it affirmed an equal division. Nickerson reasoned that the rule protects clients from referral fees that could inflate their bills for little or no work, a purpose not implicated where both lawyers did some work and the fee is not shown to be inflated or unreasonable. |
| American Computer Technology, Inc. v. Hardwick | 274 Ga. App. 62, 616 S.E.2d 838 | 2005 | Georgia Court of Appeals, in a suit by a lawyer who had recommended the client’s litigation counsel and was named in the fee agreement to receive four percent of the gross recovery, out of a ten percent contingent fee: the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury in the language of Rule 1.5(e). Following Nickerson (1996) on the similar former Directory Rule 2-107(A), the court said the rule’s purpose, protecting clients from referral fees that inflate their bills for little or no work, was not implicated because it was undisputed that the lawyer performed substantial and effective work, so the rule was not applicable; it added that the Rules are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. It also held the lawyer could sue on the fee agreement as a third-party beneficiary, and that evidence supported the jury’s finding that the client ratified it. |
| Eichholz Law Firm, P.C. v. Tate Law Group, LLC | 310 Ga. App. 848, 714 S.E.2d 413 | 2011 | Georgia Court of Appeals, in a suit between two firms on joint-venture agreements that split attorney fees: the fee-splitting provisions cannot be enforced to let a firm collect a share of a contingent fee where the clients discharged it before the contingency occurred; allowing that would contravene Rule 1.5(e)(2), whose clear intent is to prohibit sharing a legal fee with a lawyer against the will of the client. The discharged firm may seek recovery in quantum meruit for services it provided to the other firm. The court said it did not hold that fee-splitting agreements between lawyers generally are unenforceable. |
| Coleman v. Phillips | No. A23A0835 (Oct. 16, 2023) | 2023 | Georgia Court of Appeals, in a suit between two lawyers on a fee-sharing agreement the client did not sign and attested she was never told of: a fact question whether the lawyer claiming her share withdrew or was terminated precluded summary judgment; if she did, the fee-splitting provisions cannot be enforced and she may recover only in quantum meruit (following Eichholz), and if not, she is entitled to her share under the agreement as written. The court stated it expressed no opinion on whether Rule 1.5(e) applies to enforcing the agreement, because the other lawyer did not argue it and the trial court did not rely on it (n. 16). |
State Bar of Georgia Formal Advisory Opinions
Each opinion below was approved and issued, or adopted, by order of the Supreme Court of Georgia. As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched.
| Opinion | Year | What it said |
|---|---|---|
| Formal Advisory Opinion 05-9 | 2006 | On temporary lawyers: a fee division with a temporary lawyer directly supervised by a lawyer in the firm is analogous to fee splitting with an associate, which Rule 1.5(e) allows, so client consent regarding the fee is not required, though seeking it is the prudent course where the temporary lawyer’s assistance will be a material component of the representation. Without direct supervision, the opinion said, the division is allowed if the fee is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, the client is “advised of the fee splitting situation and consents”, and the total fee is reasonable; the rule’s own words are that the client is advised of the share each lawyer is to receive and does not object. Because a placement agency is not authorized to practice law, sharing fees with it would violate Rule 5.4(a); the agency may be compensated, but not by a portion of client fees. |
| Formal Advisory Opinion 05-4 | 2007 | Adopted by an order of the Supreme Court of Georgia which states that approval makes it binding on all State Bar members: a lawyer’s monthly bonus to nonlawyer employees based on the law office’s gross receipts, in addition to their salary, does not constitute a sharing of legal fees in violation of Rule 5.4, because Rule 5.4(a)(3) lets nonlawyer employees take part in a compensation plan even though it is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. It applied the earlier wording of Rule 5.4(a), which listed four exceptions and did not include today’s 5.4(a)(4) or (a)(6). |
| Formal Advisory Opinion 05-13 | 2007 | A law firm may associate another lawyer or firm to advise its clients on specialized matters and identify it as “special counsel”, if the relationship is bona fide, entails the use of special counsel’s expertise and is not established merely to serve as a referral source; any fees charged between special counsel and the firm must be divided in accordance with Rule 1.5; and for imputed disqualification under Rule 1.10 the firm and special counsel are treated as one unit. |
What our research did not find
- Every rule part and statute part on this page is undated in our research. The Supreme Court of Georgia’s order of November 3, 2011 approved Rule 1.5 as a whole with these words but does not show when they first took effect, and the order (about 2018) that moved referral payments from Rule 7.3(c) to today’s Rule 7.2(b) is not held. This page gives no effective date for any of them.
- O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53 is read from an unofficial Justia copy with no effective date stored. Its caption and editor’s note say it is effective until January 1, 2027, and repealed and reserved effective that date by Ga. L. 2026, p. 879 (HB 1344). HB 1344 is not held, and whether the section’s terms are re-enacted elsewhere is not established; this page does not say what replaces it. The earlier § 33-24-53 (1991–2014), which the editor’s note says pertained to compensation for referrals to attorneys, is not held.
- Section 33-24-53(c)(1)’s carve-out for an attorney making a referral and receiving compensation “as is permitted under applicable professional rules of conduct” names no rule, and no authority we hold reads it. This page does not say which payments it permits.
- O.C.G.A. §§ 15-19-55 and 15-19-56, Rule 7.3 (solicitation), and Rule 7.3’s authorities In the Matter of Mashek (2014) and Formal Advisory Opinion 05-6 (2007), which applied Rule 7.3 words that are not loaded, are held in our research but not in the research this page is drawn from. This page does not describe them.
- The Comments to Rule 7.2 (including Comment [8] on reciprocal referrals), Comments [7] and [8] to Rule 1.5, and Rule 5.4(c) are held but not carried here, and Rule 1.5(c), quoted in Formal Advisory Opinion 05-13, is not held as a provision. This page does not state them. Rule 7.2 Comment [5] cites a “Rule 1.5 (f)” that does not exist.
- Formal Advisory Opinion 05-4 (2007) quoted Rule 5.4(a) with four exceptions, the fourth being today’s 5.4(a)(5); today’s 5.4(a)(4) and (a)(6) were not in it. Its holding on 5.4(a)(3), whose words are unchanged, is stated as its own; it is not presented as construing today’s full list of exceptions.
- Kilgore (2004) and Hardwick (2005) quote today’s Rule 1.5(e) but rest on Nickerson v. Holloway (1996), which construed the former Directory Rule 2-107(A); Kilgore’s “[1.5 (e) (1)]” is the court’s substitution inside a quotation from Nickerson. Nickerson itself was not read, and it is not presented here as construing today’s rule.
- Formal Advisory Opinion 05-9 restates Rule 1.5(e)(2) as the client being “advised of the fee splitting situation and consents”; the rule’s words are that the client is advised of the share each lawyer is to receive and does not object. This page states the rule in its own words.
- Coleman v. Phillips (2023) carries no reporter citation in our research and is cited by docket number A23A0835 and date. It did not decide whether Rule 1.5(e) applies to a fee-sharing agreement the client was not told of, and this page does not present it as holding either way.
- No Georgia statute on dividing fees between lawyers, on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, or on choice of law for lawyer discipline was found (searched October 3, 2026). The statute search found only §§ 15-19-55, 15-19-56 and 33-24-53.
- No Georgia court decision applying Rule 5.4(a), Rule 7.2(b) or Rule 8.5(b) was found in a CourtListener discovery search plus 10 listed leads (searched October 3, 2026). This does not mean no Georgia court has applied them: Eichholz (2011) cites Brandon v. Newman (2000) for holding a lawyer’s agreement to share fees with a nonlawyer void under the State Bar disciplinary standards then in force, and Brandon was not read.
- No Formal Advisory Opinion applying Rule 7.2(b) or Rule 8.5(b) was found among the 65 on the State Bar of Georgia Handbook page (searched October 3, 2026). Formal Advisory Opinion 05-6 applies the predecessor referral-payment rule at Rule 7.3(c) and is not cited here.
- Cited leads were listed but not read: Formal Advisory Opinions 97-1, 92-2, 91-3 and 93-1; Kirschner & Venker (2006, followed by Eichholz and Coleman); Camp v. Peetluk (2003); the Matters of Carter, Falanga and Robbins; and ABA, Virginia, Maryland and New York opinions. Decisions and opinions under the former regime (Nickerson, Brandon, Sinowski, Kennedy; Formal Advisory Opinions 88-2, 94-1, 95-1 and 99-2) are deferred. The authorities on this page are not the only Georgia authority on the topic.
- Later treatment of every Georgia authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held, not that it remains good law.
Frequently asked questions
Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Georgia?
Yes, under Rule 1.5(e) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation; the client is advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and does not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and the total fee is reasonable.
Is there a cap on referral fees in Georgia?
Rule 1.5(e) states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. It requires that the division be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or that, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assume joint responsibility for the representation; that the client be advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved; and that the total fee be reasonable. Our research found no Georgia statute on dividing fees between lawyers (searched October 3, 2026).
Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Georgia?
Only for a division by joint responsibility. Under Rule 1.5(e)(1), a division that is not in proportion to the services each lawyer performs is allowed only where, by written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation. For a division in proportion to services, the rule’s words ask for no writing. In every division, the client must be advised of the share that each lawyer is to receive and must not object to the participation of all the lawyers involved (Rule 1.5(e)(2)).
Can a Georgia lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?
Rule 1.5(e) speaks of any division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. Rule 8.5(b) says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Georgia exercises its disciplinary authority. Our research found no Georgia court decision, Formal Advisory Opinion or statute applying Rule 8.5(b) (searched October 3, 2026), and no authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral.
Sources
- Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, State Bar Rule 4-102 (Rules 1.5, 5.4, 7.2, 8.5), State Bar of Georgia Handbook, fetched October 4, 2026: Rule 1.5, Rule 5.4, Rule 7.2, Rule 8.5
- O.C.G.A. § 33-24-53, unofficial copy, fetched October 3, 2026: law.justia.com
- Cases and Formal Advisory Opinions: linked in the tables above.
More states: Referral fee rules by state.
Disclaimer
This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.